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ABUSING STATE POWER OR CONTROLLING
RISK?: SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT
AND SICHER UNG VER WAHR UNG
Nora V. Demleitner*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses a paradigmatic, risk-based collateral sanc-
tion-the so-called "civil commitment" for "sexually predatory"
offenders. Even though the number of individuals covered by such
statutes is relatively small, civil confinement for this group of indi-
viduals presents the starkest example of a collateral sanction. It
deprives an offender of one of the most important aspects of life-
liberty. Sex offender commitment statutes reflect the state's in-
creasing acceptance of its crucial role in managing the risk criminal
offenders pose to public safety, often at the expense of individual
liberties.'
Sex offender commitment statutes constitute risk-based collat-
eral sanctions that employ the power of the state to confine indi-
viduals based on a prediction of future dangerousness against the
individual's right to liberty.2 Ultimately, it clearly presents the is-
sue as to what extent and how the community can protect itself
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1. Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449-59 (1992). For
a general discussion of the "risk society," see CRIME AND THE RISK SOCIETY (Pat
O'Malley ed., 1998).
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 394.910 (2002); IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (2002); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.25 (West 2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-48-20 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001
(Vernon 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2003); see also Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80, (1992) (stating that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been
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against potentially dangerous offenders, and specifically what types
of sanctions society can impose after an individual has served her
criminal justice sentence.' Implicit are questions to what extent
risk-based collateral sanctions are ever defensible,' and what sub-
stantive and procedural protections must exist to balance the
state's coercive powers against the individual's liberty interests.
In Hendricks v. Kansas, the Supreme Court specifically upheld
involuntary commitment following a criminal justice sentence for a
violent sexual "predator."'5 The Kansas statute allowed for such
detention following a criminal justice sentence upon a jury's or
judge's determination of an offender's future dangerousness result-
ing from a mental abnormality.6 Once the Court characterized the
sanction as "civil," it concluded that procedural protections man-
dated in the criminal context, such as the prohibitions on ex post
facto legislation or double jeopardy, do not apply.7 Hendricks fol-
lows the Supreme Court's uneasy parsing of so-called "civil" and
criminal sanctions8 and fails to provide a coherent picture of how
the two should be reconciled.
at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary govern-
mental action").
3. See Editor's Preface, Predators and Politics: The Dichotomies of Translation in
the Washington Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 507,
513 (1992).
4. In the current regime of collateral sanctions, non-risk based sanctions are
never appropriate as their function is punitive. Therefore, they should be abolished.
See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need For Restrictions on Col-
lateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 162-63 (1999) [here-
inafter Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile].
5. 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). Modern sex offender commitment statutes are re-
ferred to as "sexual predator" legislation; in the past, such laws were called "sexual
psychopath" legislation. Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of
Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 785
(1996).
6. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (providing the requirements for
commitment), with id. § 59-29a02 (defining sexually violent predator).
7. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69; see Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (privi-
lege against self-incrimination not applicable in proceedings under Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329-32 (1998) (emphasizing
that civil in rem forfeiture is not punitive in nature, and therefore the double jeopardy
clause does not bar the institution of such an action after the defendant's criminal
conviction); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 451-52 (1996) (discussing state's right
to use civil forfeiture statutes to seize property used for criminal purposes from an
innocent owner); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (distinguishing stan-
dards of proof in civil and criminal proceedings); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911) (distinguishing civil and criminal contempt); see also
Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Actions: The
Supreme Court's 1995-1997 Terms, 2 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 679, 685-92 (1999) (discuss-
SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT
While not without its critics, the German Sicherungsverwahrung,
at least as applied prior to a recent legislative change, may provide
a more satisfying blueprint for accommodating goals of punish-
ment and risk considerations. Sicherungsverwahrung-confine-
ment based on security concerns-may be imposed at sentencing
on select offenders who are found to constitute a high risk of recid-
ivism.9 During Sicherungsverwahrung, the offender is supposed to
be treated and rehabilitated, 0 whereas imprisonment, which pre-
cedes it, fulfills retributive and deterrent sentencing goals.
The imposition of Sicherungsverwahrung at sentencing acknowl-
edges the direct connection between the criminal offense and the
confinement, which is downplayed in United States-style civil com-
mitments for sex offenders." Moreover, it accomplishes the goals
of the criminal justice system without creating uncomfortable sen-
tence dislocations. 12 While this Article will highlight the problems
with Sicherungsverwahrung, it supports an approach that borrows
heavily from it as a more honest and satisfying way to accommo-
date the functions of sentencing while protecting public safety. The
proposal, which derives from the German model, would allow for a
limitation on all risk-based collateral sanctions by integrating them
into the sentencing process, and acknowledging the exercise of the
state's coercive powers in that process.
ing the negative affects of labeling an action entirely criminal or civil for purposes of
determining a defendant's procedural rights); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanc-
tions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1864-
71 (1992) (recommending that a coherent jurisprudence must first distinguish be-
tween civil and criminal processes within the field of punitive sanctions and second
differentiate between conduct for which punitive sanctions are fitting and conduct for
which they are inappropriate).
9. Tatjana HOrnle, Penal Law and Sexuality: Recent Reforms in German Criminal
Law, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 639, 674-82 (2000).
10. Id. at 680-82.
11. Even though a criminal conviction is a prerequisite for the commitment of sex
offenders, by separating the commitment hearing from the sentencing for the criminal
offense-often by years, if not decades-a disconnect between the two is being
created.
12. See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in Legis-
lative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001); Wayne A. Logan, Jacob's Legacy: Sex Of-
fender Registration and Community Notification Laws, Practice, and Procedure in
Minnesota, 29 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1287-1321 (2003) (discussing impact
of high profile sex offenses on legislative changes, especially in Minnesota); Jonathan
Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 1111 (2000).
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Part I of this Article outlines the most prevalent United States
approaches to the control of sexual offenders, focusing on civil
commitment and the Supreme Court's decision in Hendricks. Part
II details the German Sicherungsverwahrung, which is designed to
guarantee greater state control over sex offenders considered dan-
gerous to the public. It describes the origin of the sanction and its
fit into the German sentencing scheme. Moreover, it provides a
critique of this sanction and outlines recent changes to the practice.
In Part III, this Article proposes the adoption of a scheme based on
the concept of Sicherungsverwahrung. Instead of advocating that
the United States borrow the concept in toto, the Article modifies
it by accepting it as a separative criminal justice sanction that
makes public safety its hallmark. The proposed model responds to
both the German critics of Sicherungsverwahrung and the United
States critics of current sex offender commitment legislation and
practice. The ultimate goal is to create a more honest, less punitive
sentencing structure that assures proportionality and public safety
without sacrificing individual liberties.
I. THE UNITED STATES' APPROACH TO SEX OFFENDERS
In the wake of some highly publicized sexual offenses against
children, many of which involved recidivists, the states and the fed-
eral government passed a myriad of statutes designed to control
the risk sex offenders allegedly pose. 3 In a number of Western
European countries and Canada, similar developments occurred. 4
While the term "sex offender" encompasses a large set of individu-
13. E.g., Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Com-
mission's Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV.
563, 564, 571-79 (2002) [hereinafter Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles] (dis-
cussing Congress' passage of the bills and the motives behind them). This occurred
even though sexually violent crime did not rise at a faster rate than other crime. Stu-
art Scheingold et al., The Politics of Sexual Psychopathy: Washington State's Sexual
Predator Legislation, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 809, 812-13 (1992).
For an additional example of a creative approach to sex offenders, see Doe v. City of
Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2003) (striking down city's order banning con-
victed sex offender from all public parks).
14. Hans-J6rg Albrecht, Dangerous Criminal Offenders in the German Criminal
Justice System, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 69, 69-72 (1997) (explaining German crimi-
nal law's two step sentencing procedure); Nora V. Demleitner, Searching for a Solu-
tion: How to Punish, Restrain and Treat Sex Offenders, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 59,
59 (1997) [hereinafter Demleitner, Searching for a Solution] (comparing and contrast-
ing the American and European sex offender legislation); Michael Jackson, The Sen-
tencing of Dangerous and Habitual Offenders in Canada, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP.
256, 256 (1997) (discussing the Habitual Offender legislation and the Dangerous Of-
fender legislation enacted in Canada).
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als ranging from the statutory or serial rapist to the individual
downloading child pornography or a mere exhibitionist, the pub-
lic's fear and disgust are generally centered on those violating chil-
dren, and sometimes on violent rapists of adult women.15
Nevertheless, current legislation often makes little distinction be-
tween sub-categories of sexual offenders. 16 Its focus has been on
longer prison terms for all sex offenders, as well as new means to
prevent the commission of future offenses upon release.' 7 The
baseless assumptions that all sex offenders are at a higher risk of
recidivism and are uniquely unsuitable for rehabilitation have
driven much of the legislation.18
A. Extended Prison Terms, Notification, and
Registration for Sex Offenders
One set of statutes increased the sanctions imposed directly on
sex offenders at sentencing, such as lengthened prison terms.19
Other examples of increased sanctions are mandatory post-release
supervision and strengthened supervision conditions imposed on
sex offenders upon release.2°
The most dramatic change, though, occurred with regard to so-
called collateral sanctions following release. Collateral sanctions as
15. This Article refers to the violent sex offender as "he" because offenders of that
type are predominently, but not exclusively, male. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Not Only
Men are Molesters, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at Al (of 352 convicted offenders
civilly commited in California as sexual "predators," one is a woman). The approach
proposed, as it is applicable to all collateral sanctions, is, of course, appropriate for
male and female offenders. For a discussion of the social construction of dangerous-
ness, see DEIDRE N. GREIG, NEITHER BAD NOR MAD: THE COMPETING DISCOURSES
OF PSYCHIATRY, LAW AND POLITICS 17-18 (2002).
16. See Eric Lotke, Politics and Irrelevance: Community Notification Statutes, 10
FED. SENTENCING REP. 64, 66-67 (1997) (critiquing the overbreadth of California's
notification statutes).
17. Demleitner, Searching for a Solution, supra note 14, at 60; e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE. §§ 9.94A.510-.515 (2000) (providing higher penalties for sex offenders); id.
§§ 13.40.020(3), 13.40.210(4) (providing post release supervision and civil obligations
and restitution); id. § 13.40.160(3) (providing the court with the ability to order an
examination to determine if a juvenile sex offenders is amenable to treatment); id.
§§ 4.24.550, 9A.44.130 (discussing mandatory registration of sex offenders).
18. Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1203,
1208-11, 1215 (1998) (discussing sex offender's recidivism and its effect on legislation).
For a recidivism study, see PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 7-10
(2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (last visited July
15, 2003). For an account of the apparent failure of sex offender programs, see Lita
Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3-4 (1989).
19. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles, supra note 13, at 571-73.
20. Id. at 566, 571-73.
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a whole can be grouped broadly into two categories-those which
are risk-based and those which are not. The former are based on
incapacitative and preventive reasoning,2' while the latter might be
defended on retributive or deterrent grounds.22 Even though some
of the sex offender-focused collateral sanctions include a risk com-
ponent, disputes have arisen over their effectiveness in controlling
such risk.23
During the 1990s, Congressional legislation required the states to
set up sex-offender registries for certain types of sex offenders in
the community.24 In 1996, through Megan's Law, named after
seven-year-old Megan Kanka who was sexually abused and killed
by a recidivist sex offender, Congress mandated states to release
certain information about sex offenders to the public.25 While
these acts have been defended on grounds of risk control, many of
them are counterproductive and drawn too broadly to be successful
as preventive measures.2 6 Notification statutes are misleading as
the risk of re-offending is difficult, if not impossible, to assess.
Many sex offender notification statutes are also drawn too broadly,
as they include offenders, such as statutory rapists whose recidi-
21. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 4, at 156-60 (discussing col-
lateral sanctions and their justifications on preventive grounds).
22. See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT
13-25 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (describing the multitude of
collateral sanctions). Examples of non-risk based collateral sanctions include broad
restrictions on ex-offender voting rights, the denial of access to public housing for ex-
drug felons and the limitations on federal education benefits for those convicted of a
drug offense, however minor. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to
Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 64 (2002) (discussing federal law limiting federal funding
to schools that imposed a mandatory one-year expulsion for students bringing weap-
ons to school); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to
Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 753, 769-73 (2000) [hereinafter Demleitner, Continuing Payment] (discussing
criminal disenfranchisement and its justifications) ; Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The
Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002
Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1072-95 (exploring justifications for criminal disenfranchisement).
23. See, e.g., Lotke, supra note 16, at 65-67; see also Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v.
Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1164-65 (2003) (upholding Connecticut's statute requiring publi-
cation of names of convicted sex offenders without determining dangerousness of
individual).
24. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, tit. XVII, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071); Demleitner, First
Peoples, First Principles, supra note 13, at 570-71.
25. Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996); 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071-14072 (1999).
26. Lotke, supra note 16, at 65-67.
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vism rates are very low. 2 7 Instead of being useful as preventive
measures, these statutes divert public attention from offenders who
may constitute an increased risk. Moreover, as notification is lim-
ited to specific geographic areas, ex-offenders may be able to es-
cape heightened suspicion by leaving this area to commit further
offenses. 28
Presumably, the only guaranteed method to prevent the further
commission of sexual offenses by former sex offenders is to inca-
pacitate them.29  Longer prison sentences serve this purpose.
Under current law, however, almost all sex offenders, barring those
who commit murder in conjunction with a sex crime, will ultimately
be released from prison.30 For the most dangerous of them, a num-
ber of states have developed special legislation leading to what
they term "civil commitment. '31 As the prison terms for sex of-
fenders have been lengthened, interest in sex offender commitment
statutes is likely to decline.32
27. See, e.g., Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 S. Ct. at 1164-65 (upholding Connect-
icut's sex offender notification statute which does not require state to assess danger-
ousness of convicted sex offenders before putting their name on its website).
28. Lotke, supra note 16, at 66.
29. This assumes that none of these inmates will escape. Moreover, only certain
populations will be protected entirely, such as children. Rape of other inmates and of
(female) correctional staff may occur even in prison. The former type of victimiza-
tion, however, continues to remain uncounted and often unacknowledged, and the
latter is presumably less likely to occur than if the offender were released back into
society.
30. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 9.94A.510-.515 (2001) (the only crime that carries
life without parole as a penalty is aggravated murder).
31. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 394.910 (2002); IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.25 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-48-20 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001
(Vernon 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010. While the state of Virginia has
adopted a legal basis for the civil commitment of dangerous and mentally abnormal
sex offenders, it has not yet allocated the required funds. See Virginia Horror Crime
is Used in Fight to Lengthen Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2003, at A13 (discussing
legislative proposals to provide funding in Virginia).
32. W. Lawrence Fitch, Sex Offender Commitment in the United States: Legislative
and Policy Concerns (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 18-19, on file with author);
Letter from Professor Eric Janus, William Mitchell College of Law, to Nora V.
Demleitner (Feb. 23, 2003) (on file with author).
The number of individuals under such confinement, however, might remain high as
release appears unlikely. See, e.g., Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use
of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissiblity and Ac-
countability 7 (Apr. 25, 2003), available at www.forensicexaminers.com/foren-
sicuse.pdf (last visited July 15, 2003).
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B. Civil Commitment for Sex Offenders
Collateral sanctions vary in the way in which they can be im-
posed upon criminal offenders.3 Some automatically follow a
criminal conviction, while others must be imposed separately
through an administrative process.34 Where separate administra-
tive action is required, the criminal conviction is a necessary, but
not sufficient prerequisite for the imposition of the additional sanc-
tion." Civil confinement for sex offenders falls into this category,
as it must be imposed judicially or through a jury following a hear-
ing that typically includes an array of procedural protections.36
Statutorily, these civil commitment statutes do not require a crimi-
nal conviction. 37 A charge of a sex offense is sufficient for the insti-
tution of such proceedings, as would be an acquittal based on
insanity.38 Such civil commitment can no longer be considered a
collateral sanction as it is not based on a conviction. A state, how-
ever, should not be in a position to evade limitations on collateral
sanctions merely by adding triggers other than a conviction for in-
stituting such proceedings. In addition, existing legislation has
been applied largely against offenders who were about to be re-
leased from confinement after having served long sentences for
sexual offenses.39
Civil commitment statutes for sex offenders are arguably fash-
ioned on civil commitment statutes for the mentally incompetent. 40
Those do not require a criminal conviction, but instead focus on
determining mental illness and the danger the individual poses to
33. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 4, at 154-58.
34. Id. at 154.
35. See id. at 154-58 (discussing various collateral consequences).
36. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 394.913, 394.915 (requiring various procedures such as
full notice to multidisciplinary teams and finding of probable cause); WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.09.040 (1999) (requiring certain procedural safeguards such as a judge de-
termining whether there is probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually
violent predator before that person is taken into custody).
37. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030(3)-(4) (allowing prosecutor to allege a
person who has committed a sex offense is a sexually violent predator).
38. E.g., id. A discussion of the problems implicit in charge-based civil commit-
ment of sex offenders is beyond the scope of this Article.
39. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2001) (seeking the civil commit-
ment of a previously convicted sexual offender based on the application of Hen-
dricks); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (based on Kansas' Sexually
Violent Predator Act, seeking the commitment of Hendricks, an inmate who had a
history of molesting children and was scheduled to be released from prison).
40. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-57 (discussing where states have in narrow cir-
cumstances provided for the civil commitment of people who are unable to control
their behavior and thus pose a danger to public health and safety).
1628
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himself or others.41 The goal of civil commitment statutes is to pro-
vide an effective therapy to persons committed, so as to enable
them to live independently upon release.42 On the other hand, sex
offender commitment statutes generally focus on the danger the
offender poses to others because of a "mental abnormality" or
"mental disorder," and are aimed primarily at incapacitation rather
than treatment.43 These differences bring sex offender commit-
ment statutes closer to so-called "criminal sexual psychopath 44
legislation than civil commitment. Starting in the 1950s, sexual
psychopaths, however defined, were targeted for indefinite deten-
tion.45 Many of these offenders were not dangerous, but were con-
sidered socially deviant,46 and upon conviction were either
sentenced or committed civilly. During the early to mid-1990s, a
number of states reinvigorated their civil commitment statutes for
41. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 429 (1979)) (finding that to commit an individual to a mental institution in a
civil proceeding, the state is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the person is mentally ill and requires hospitalization for his own welfare and the
protection of others). Civil commitment statutes for sex offenders also cover those
who are considered "not guilty by reason of insanity"-a standard that many states
have changed to "guilty but insane"-"not guilty by reason of a mental disease of
defect," and offenders who are found incompetent to stand trial. See, e.g., Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 352 (Kansas civil commitment statute applied to all of these categories of
sex offenders in addition to those convicted of and charged with sex crimes). The
number of such offenders is presumably very small, and would have been covered by
existing civil commitment statutes. Id. at 351-52.
42. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (stating that states have a
legitimate interest in providing care to its citizens that cannot take care of them-
selves); Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional
Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 182 (1996) [hereinafter
Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence] (stating that the purpose of confinement is not to
reduce the capacity of the individual, but rather to restore autonomy and thereby
enhance her capacities).
43. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010
(1999); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358. (stating that commitment statutes narrow the class
of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their
aggressiveness).
44. Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1317, 1351-52 (1998).
45. Id. at 1351-52 (describing "sexual psychopath" laws passed between 1937 and
1957). For a discussion of the historical background of such legislationin Canada and
Great Britain, see Yukimi Henry, Psychiatric Gating: Questioning the Civil Committal
of Convicted Sex Offenders, 59 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 229, 230-46 (2001).
46. Henry, supra note 45, at 231. For a description of the abuse of such legislation
in Alabama and the horrible conditions in state mental hospitals until at least the
early 1970's, see James Allon Garland, The Low Road to Violence: Governmental Dis-
crimination as a Catalyst for Pandemic Hate Crime, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 75-76
(2001).
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sex offenders,47 despite the criticism levied against earlier legisla-
tion in this area and its abolition during the 1970s.4"
The constitutionality of such statutes was challenged in Kansas v.
Hendricks.49 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld Kansas' civil
commitment statute for sex offenders against challenges under the
Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the
federal Constitution. °
1. Kansas v. Hendricks
The impending release of a sex offender considered highly dan-
gerous caused the Kansas legislature to pass the Sexually Violent
Predator Act in 1994.51 It considered the existing civil commitment
statute insufficient to address the situation of sexual offenders, be-
cause the sexual offenders have different treatment needs and pose
a different level of threat.52 The new legislation allowed for the
civil confinement of persons who had a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" that was likely to lead them to engage in
"predatory acts of sexual violence" if they had been "convicted of
or charged with a sexually violent offense."53 Such a statute ap-
peared to follow Supreme Court mandates handed down in a num-
ber of earlier cases that prohibited as unconstitutional confinement
based solely on dangerousness.54 The Court in those cases held
that dangerousness alone cannot be the reason for detention, and
required dangerousness with "proof of some additional factor."55
The Kansas law allows the local prosecutor, upon notification of
impending release of the prisoner, to petition for the person's in-
47. Fitch, supra note 32 (manuscript at 3).
48. See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND
SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE THIRTIES TO THE EIGHTIES 858-60, 935-42
(1977) [hereinafter PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH] (stating that sex psychopath
and sexual offender statutes are approaches that have failed).
49. 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
50. Id. at 370-71.
51. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
52. Id.
53. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350, 352, 358; see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-59-
29a20; cf. Denno, supra note 44, at 1352 (describing statutory prerequisites for com-
mitment under earlier "sexual psychopath" legislation).
54. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-315 (1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366
(1986); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cty., 309 U.S. 270, 271-
72 (1940).
55. Heller, 509 U.S. at 314-15; Allen, 478 U.S. at 366; Minnesota ex rel. Pearson,
309 U.S. at 271-72. For a discussion of indefinite detention and dangerousness "plus,"
see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 369-73 (2002).
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voluntary civil commitment as a sex offender.5 6 The statute man-
dates a judicial hearing on "probable cause" for certification,
followed by a psychiatric assessment of the inmate's mental and
psychological make-up.5 7 After a trial in which the state has to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender is a violent sex-
ual predator, the person would be sent to a secure psychiatric insti-
tution for treatment until his mental abnormality has been changed
so as to allow for his release. 8
The Supreme Court held the Kansas statute to accord with tradi-
tional involuntary commitment statutes as "[i]t requires a finding
of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the exis-
tence of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his
dangerous behavior. '59 The Court found the statute non-retribu-
tive, as the criminal conviction serves merely to supply evidence of
dangerousness or mental abnormality.6 ° Since the Court did not
discern any other punishment purpose behind the statute, such as
deterrence, it did not view the statute as criminal, but instead con-
sidered it an appropriate state restraint on mentally ill and danger-
ous offenders. 61 As the statute falls squarely into the civil
paradigm, the Court held that it violates neither the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, nor the prohibition on ex post facto legislation.62 Ac-
cording to the majority, the state's police power-its function as
the guarantor of public safety and security-allows it to detain the
dangerous sexual offender.63
The comparison with civil commitment statutes, framing the cat-
egorization of sex offender commitment statutes as civil, 64 appears
forced. Civil commitment statutes have historically been used only
56. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03.
57. Id. § 59-29a05.
58. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353 (describing procedure). In Hendricks, the psychiat-
ric facility was on prison grounds. Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 358.
60. Id. at 362.
61. Id. at 368-69.
62. Id. at 371.
63. For a distinction between the state's police power and its parens patriae power
in civil commitment proceedings, see David J. Gottlieb, Preventive Detention of Sex
Offenders, 50 KAN. L. REV. 1031, 1035-36 (2002).
64. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (holding that the Act does not establish crimi-
nal proceedings and that involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act is not
punitive).
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for individuals with the most serious psychiatric disorders. 65 Usu-
ally, patients are stabilized, and released after approximately thirty
days.66
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which three other
justices joined in whole or in part.67 He did not find a violation of
the Due Process Clause,68 but instead focused on the state's provi-
sion of treatment.69 In light of the delay of treatment during incar-
ceration, which deprives the offender of any opportunity to be
cured prior to release, Justice Breyer found the statute to be puni-
tive. 70 Therefore, he would have held it in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause.7 Instead of civil commitment, Justice Breyer recom-
mended sentencing at the maximum of the statutorily authorized
prison term, use of consecutive sentences, or of recidivism statutes
to lengthen sentences for sex offenders.72
In recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly been asked
to distinguish criminal from civil sanctions. 73 Despite enormous ef-
forts to do so in a principled manner, the Court has not been able
to draw a clear line.7 ' Nevertheless, it has found commitment stat-
utes for so-called "sexual predators" civil, and therefore exempt
from the protections that generally apply in criminal cases.75 In
65. See PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH, supra note 48, at 862-63 (stating that
all sex psychopath legislation during the thirties to eighties had extreme danger as a
common factor).
66. The information in this paragraph is derived from Fitch, supra note 32 (manu-
script at 1). The mental illness in these cases is medically based, rather than legally
constructed, as is the case in sex offender commitment statutes. Id. (manuscript at
14). Even those sent to mental institutions upon a finding of legal "insanity," gener-
ally do not spend substantial periods of time there. Id. (manuscript at 1).
67. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Justice Ginsburg did not join in this part of the dissent. Id. at 373 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. at 373-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 381 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It made a crucial difference to Justice
Breyer that the state did not appear to act in the individual's best interest by provid-
ing him with treatment already during his criminal sentence. Id. at 396.
71. Id. at 395-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 395 (Breyer, J., dissenting); but see MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., SEX OF-
FENDER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT BOARD STUDY 17 (2000) (reporting that en-
hanced sentenced are often used as bargaining chips in plea negotiations).
73. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (stating
that in some cases the distinction is difficult; factors relevant to the inquiry include
whether the sanction involves a restraint or disability, whether it has historically been
regarded as punishment, and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime).
74. Id.
75. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (discussing Hendrick's distinc-
tion between dangerous sex offenders subject to civil commitment from other danger-
ous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal
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recent cases, the Supreme Court has approved of even broader
coverage of sex offender commitment statutes and looser protec-
tions for sex offenders than applied in Hendricks.76
2. Treatment: The State's Obligation?
Hendricks epitomizes the public's fear of so-called "sexual
predators." Civil commitment statutes make up only a small aspect
of the "war on sexual predators," but are indicative of the concerns
of the public, as well as the ease with which civil instruments can be
used to achieve incapacitative goals.77 Legislative debates quoted
in Hendricks indicate that some legislators saw civil confinement
merely as an alternative to or extension of imprisonment.78 For
some, civil confinement created the option of a virtual life term for
sexual offenders.79
As sanctions for sexual offenses have increased over the last dec-
ade, some offenders may be perceived as not having received a suf-
ficient sentence, either from a retributive or an incapacitative
perspective. This may be the case either because offenders did not
avail themselves of treatment options available in prison, because
the sentence they received at the time of their sentencing appears
inappropriate from today's perspective, or because even a maxi-
mum sentence does not seem to guarantee safety. For these of-
fenders, civil commitment statutes similar to Kansas's legislation8'
appear to present the only opportunity for further incapacitation.
Currently, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have such
laws.8'
proceedings); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260 (2001) (finding the Washington Act,
which authorizes civil commitment of "sexually violent predators," to be civil in
nature).
76. See, e.g., Crane, 534 U.S. at 412-14 (refusing to define narrowly term "lack of
control," the finding of which warrants "civil" commitment).
77. John F. Kavanagh, Jr. & Matthew C. Welnicki, A Practical Overview of Massa-
chusetts General Laws Chapter 123A: Care, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Sexually
Dangerous Persons, 24 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (arguing that legislators
have passed civil commitment statutes and registration statutes for sexual offenders in
part in response to public and media pressure). For the genesis of the Kansas law, see
Gottlieb, supra note 63, at 1047-48.
78. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372-73 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. Gottlieb, supra note 63, at 1048 (stating that the Act was packaged as one
"whose purpose was to provide essentially lifetime incarceration for a group of indi-
viduals who never should be released.").
80. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
81. Fitch, supra note 32 (manuscript at 3). For a listing of various sexual predator
statutes, see supra note 3.
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To prevent due process concerns, the civil commitment must
promise treatment and hold out the possibility of a cure for the
mental abnormality or an end to the dangerousness. Many legisla-
tors and members of the public, however, have already indicated
that they consider the possibility of "curing" sexual predators re-
mote, if existent at all. If the possibility of curing is so remote, then
civil commitment for these sex offenders undermines the criminal
justice and the mental health systems. 82 It supplants criminal jus-
tice sanctions while confining individuals who are either untreat-
able, or whose underlying condition may not constitute a mental
illness.83 The failure to provide any, or at least adequate, treatment
during incarceration, led the American Psychiatric Association to
conclude that sex offender commitment is "incapacitative rather
than therapeutic. 8 4
Even if those who believe "nothing works" are wrong, existing
treatment options that hold out the promise of success are very
expensive.85 If civil commitment is to fulfill its function, such treat-
ment options must be provided in psychiatric facilities housing sex
offenders.86 Instead, however, many such institutions provide only
prison-like confinement without treatment.87 This reflects the as-
82. Jennifer M. Connor, Note, Seling v. Young: Constitutionally Protected but Un-
just Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 511, 536-38 (2002) (stating that the American Psychological Association chas-
tises civil commitment of sex offenders as a way to detain people "for whom confine-
ment rather than treatment [is] the real goal.").
83. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 45, at 231 (stating that a major criticism of civil
confinement is that it is "an illegitimate use of the mental health system to confine a
class of individuals whose mental status and responsiveness to treatment is a matter of
clinical dispute.").
84. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Assoc., DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE RE-
PORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 12 (1999) [hereinafter DANGER.
OUS SEX OFFENDERS]. The mental health establishment has generally been critical of
sex offender commitment legislation. Fitch, supra note 32 (manuscript at 3) (stating
that the American Psychiatric Association ("APA") claimed that, "no one has sug-
gested these laws reflect a renewed faith in the power of psychiatry to cure sex
offenders.").
85. Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of
Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 130-32 (1999).
86. Anna Gorman, Sex Offenders Seek End to Extra Jail Time, L.A. TIMES, May
13, 2002, at L.A. Metro pt. 2, at 1. Most prisons housing sex offenders also do not
provide for such treatment options. Id. They should do so, however, to justify the
state exerting coercive powers to detain dangerous offenders.
87. See, e.g., Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151-52 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(modifying contempt order once state facility began to offer appropriate treatment
for sex offenders), affd sub nom., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000);
Connor, supra note 82, at 525-26 (recounting Turay litigation which challenged ab-
sence of treatment for sexual offenders held in Washington's Special Commitment
Center).
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sumption that "nothing works" for sex offenders, and the primary
rationale for commitment must be incapacitation-preventing the
offenders from re-joining the larger society.88
3. Civil Commitment as a Collateral Sanction: A Critique
Much of the criticism of Hendricks centers around the categori-
zation of post-sentence confinement for sex offenders as a civil
sanction.89 Were such commitment to be styled as a criminal pen-
alty, then all the protections otherwise applicable in criminal cases
would apply.9" Others have challenged the Kansas legislative
scheme as inappropriate, independent of whether it is considered a
civil or criminal sanction.91 They consider it impossible to predict
correctly the future risk any offender poses, and view the confine-
ment of any individual based on such a prediction as an unneces-
sary and unconstitutional deprivation of liberty in a democracy.92
Hendricks is not only a case about civil commitment of sex of-
fenders, or a disconcerting account of society's current approach to
such criminals, but rather epitomizes the debate about collateral
sanctions.93 Collateral sanctions sit uneasily at the civil/criminal di-
88. Friedland, supra note 85, at 82.
89. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Dorsett, Kansas v. Hendricks: Marking the Beginning of
a Dangerous New Era in Civil Commitment, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 113, 156-57 (1998);
Carol S. Steiker, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998).
90. This Article does not review the constitutional issues in Hendricks that arose
from the retroactive application of the law to Hendricks himself. Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997). For such an analysis, see Adam J. Falk, Sex Offend-
ers, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility: The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil
Commitment After Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 117, 130-31 (1999);
Friedland, supra note 85, at 77-154; Joseph Hough, Seling v. Young: No "As Applied"
Challenge to Civil Commitment, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 251, 252-84 (2001).
91. See, e.g., Erich H. Gaston, Privacy & Autonomy in Health Care: Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997): The Court's Unworkable Constitutional Standards
and Flawed Analysis Threaten Freedom, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 227, 264-65
(1998).
92. Even though I have serious misgivings about the possibility of accurately as-
sessing an individual offender's future risk and am deeply concerned about the high
likelihood of false positives, I allow for the need to confine extremely dangerous of-
fenders who are considered highly likely to commit serious violent acts, especially
those directed at a vulnerable population, such as children. Therefore, this Article
assumes that the state must have at its disposal certain instruments to detain particu-
larly dangerous offenders beyond the time that a retributive sanction would allow, as
long as there is treatment available for them. The state, however, should restrictively
exercise its right to put the population's safety interest ahead of individual liberty
interests.
93. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-69 (discussing the due process, ex post facto, and
double jeopardy issues based around the civil/criminal distinction).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
vide. 94 They are styled "collateral" because they are viewed as
non-criminal even though they carry the hallmarks of criminal
sanctions; many are punitive, focused on incapacitation and deter-
rence.95 Nevertheless, the non-criminal label makes it possible for
them to be assessed at a point other than sentencing. Kansas, for
example, allows for the imposition of confinement under the sex
offender legislation after the completion of imprisonment.96 Even
though the framework provided by the Kansas legislature for civil
commitment appears desirable if compared to the wholesale impo-
sition of other collateral sanctions, it perpetuates the existence of a
bifurcated system that renders the existing sentencing framework
unpredictable, inconsistent and irrational.
In these respects the Kansas scheme for sex offender commit-
ment reflects the problems of collateral sanctions generally.97 Col-
lateral sanctions are imposed on criminal offenders either
automatically or through a separate, administrative process.98
Most sanctions apply only after such offenders have served their
criminal sentences.99 Such sanctions limit the political, social, or
economic rights of offenders. 10 They restrict their ability to vote,
to run for political office, to live in public housing, or to get state
licenses for professions ranging from attorney to barber. 10' While
sex offender commitment does not impact as large a number of ex-
offenders as other collateral consequences, 0 2 in the summer of
2002, 1,632 individuals were labeled sexually violent predators and
846 were confined pending a commitment hearing.'0 3 Even though
the number of individuals directly affected may be comparatively
94. Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral Damage": No Reentry for Drug Offenders, 47
VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2002) [hereinafter Demleitner, "Collateral Damage"].
95. Id.
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994).
97. See, e.g., Demleitner, "Collateral Damage", supra note 94, at 1048 (generally,
collateral sanctions "hinder individual offenders' rehabilitation and reintegration into
society by restricting welfare benefits, employment and skills training opportunities,
and the reunion with the family.").
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1048.
100. Id. at 1032.
101. For a discussion of the myriad collateral sanctions in existence, see
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 4, at 154-58; Travis, supra note 22, at
20-25.
102. See, e.g., JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELON DISENFRANCHISE-
MENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1998). As of 1998, approximately 3.9 million
people were disenfranchised either because they had felony records, or were impris-
oned. Id. at 1-2.
103. Fitch, supra note 32 (manuscript at 6).
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small, sex offender commitment is among the most extreme of col-
lateral sanctions as it deprives an offender of his liberty after he
has finished his criminal justice sentence. 104
In determining whether a collateral sanction amounts to criminal
punishment, courts begin by ascertaining the intent of the legisla-
ture.'0 5 As long as the legislature did not intend the law to impose
punishment, the statute is presumptively non-criminal. 10 6 When
looking beyond the legislative intent, the courts tend to view only
retribution and deterrence as traditional goals of punishment. 10 7
Alternatively, incapacitation is considered a goal of the criminal
and civil systems."0 8 If courts were to acknowledge incapacitation
as a traditional punishment goal, this would undermine the care-
fully crafted, albeit flimsy, distinction between civil and criminal
sanctions. Most importantly, if incapacitation were viewed as a
punishment goal, legislators would have to mandate individualized
risk assessments and create procedural protections for ex-offenders
subject to collateral sanctions. 10 9
In many respects, involuntary confinement for sex offenders al-
ready presents a narrowly tailored approach to collateral sanctions.
For example, the civil confinement process is limited to sex offend-
ers,' 10 as opposed to many collateral sanctions which impact a vast
array of offenders."' In fact, only sex offenders who present a fu-
ture danger and have a mental defect that makes it impossible for
them to control their sexual desires are eligible. 1 2 This targeted
104. Id. (manuscript at 18); John Q. LaFond, Washington's Sexually Violent
Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 656-57 (1992).
105. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
106. Id. at 368-69.
107. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (describing "retribution or general
deterrence" as functions of criminal law) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring)); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986) (quoting
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
108. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-75 (2002); Gottlieb, supra note 63, at 1046-49.
110. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350-53 (Kansas statute limits sanctions to sex-
ual predators).
111. See, e.g., Demleitner, "Collateral Damage", supra note 94, at 1035-36 (citing
federal housing policies which exclude drug offenders from publicly subsidized hous-
ing); see also FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 102 (discussing sweeping state statutes
disenfranchising convicted felony offenders).
112. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (requiring "proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.").
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approach makes it more likely that the civil commitment laws ful-
fill their purpose-protecting the public.
Whether civil commitment laws protect the public, however, de-
pends largely on the definitions of the key terms in such statutes
and the applicable procedure. How is dangerousness to be as-
sessed? What type and level of mental abnormality is required?
For example, under Kansas law, the state merely has to show a
"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that predisposes
the offender to commit future sexual crimes." 3 Even though the
state has conceded that the interpretation of these terms must be
limited to recognized mental conditions, the assessment does not
appear to provide any substantial limitation on the offender's clas-
sification since it includes "antisocial personality disorder," a disor-
der from which probably about half of all criminal defendants
suffer." '4
The severity of sex offender commitment causes those selected
for such confinement to be granted protections tantamount to
those in the criminal process." 5 This differs from many other col-
lateral sanctions, which are imposed automatically upon the con-
viction of a specific type of offense.' 6 In those cases, no individual
risk assessment occurs and therefore no procedural protections
apply. 117
Even though civil confinement statutes improve upon other col-
lateral sanctions regimes, the mere possibility of such a sanction
following the criminal punishment undermines the sentencing pro-
cess and purposes of punishment. 18 Many sex offenses carry high
113. VAN ZYL SMIT, supra note 109, at 76. "The shift from 'mental illness' to
'mental abnormality' ... is a move away from the expertise of the relatively indepen-
dent quasi-medical expert to the expert knowledge of criminal justice professionals,
such as prosecutors, who now take the initiative in keeping 'sexual predators' in indef-
inite detention." Id.
114. Gottlieb, supra note 63, at 1040.
115. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1997) (describing protec-
tions granted by the state of Kansas during involuntary confinement procedures for
sex offenders). But the procedures vary depending on state law. See, e.g., John Kir-
win, One Arrow in the Quiver-Using Civil Commitment As One Component of a
State's Response to Sexual Violence, 29 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1135, 1185 (2003)
(describing Minnesota's procedures).
116. See, e.g., Demleitner, "Collateral Damage", supra note 94, at 1034-45 (stating
that many are denied access to federal benefits, such as food stamps or subsidized
housing upon their first conviction and may be permanently denied benefits upon a
subsequent conviction).
117. Id.
118. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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maximum sentences, often including life terms. 119 In determinate
and indeterminate sentencing regimes, the criminal sentences for
sex offenders are based not only on retribution but also on predic-
tions of the offender's future dangerousness.120  Therefore, in-
capacitative considerations frequently enter the sentencing
process.
12 1
The court has no control over the likelihood that the offender be
civilly confined following the prison term.1 2 2 Rather than relying
on an unpredictable civil process, a court may be likely to impose a
sentence that accounts for community protection. 123 Yet, no medi-
cal or psychiatric assessment of the offender is required and the
court decision does not depend on a finding of mental abnormal-
ity.124  In fact, it is likely that courts impose relatively high
sentences on all sex offenders for community protection purposes,
even if lengthy prison terms overpredict the danger of recidi-
vism. 125 Thus, many sex offenders may serve an unnecessary com-
munity protection component of their sentence based on their low
risk of recidivism.1 26 Moreover, offenders who are subsequently
predicted to be dangerous and mentally deficient under the invol-
untary confinement laws are doubly punished as they serve the
community protection component of their sentence twice-first in
prison, and then again in a psychiatric facility.1 27
119. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (J) (2001); id. § 21-4716(F)(ii) (listing
predatory sexual conduct as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes); People v.
Snow, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 323-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a sentence of
eighty-five years to life for child molestatioin did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the state and federal constitutions).
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (J); id. § 21-4716(F)(ii); Demleitner, Searching for
a Solution, supra note 14, at 59.
121. Demleitner, Searching for a Solution, supra note 14, at 59.
122. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 385 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
123. PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH, supra note 48, at 853-86.
124. Id.
125. Any reference to recidivism herein pertains to the commission of a serious
sexual offense following a sex offense conviction. DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS,
supra note 84, at 132 (explaining that recidivism can be defined narrowly as the com-
mission of an identical crime or more broadly as the commission of any subsequent
crime). While overall recidivism rates for all offenders are high, sex offenders are
highly unlikely to commit another dangerous sex crime even though their reconvic-
tion rates for another sexual offense are high. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 18, at 8
tbls. 9, 10.
126. See LaFond, supra note 104, at 667 (noting that sex offenders have relatively
low rates of recidivism or at least rates similar to other crimes and are given higher
sentences based on the misconception that sexual offenders are recidivists).
127. Id. at 656-57.
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The consequences of being confined under a sex offender com-
mitment statute are grave. A Minnesota study regarding sex of-
fender commitment demonstrated that between 1975 and 1995 no
offender had been discharged, and only one had been provisionally
discharged. 128 While in 1994, fewer than a quarter of all civilly
committed mentally ill had spent more than a year in a state
mental hospital, 129 eighty percent of all committed sex offenders
had been there for more than a year, and almost half of them had
been there for more than two years-one tenth had already been
confined for over a decade. 130 As a result, for most it seems that
civil commitment as a sex offender has turned into lifetime
confinement. 131
If involuntary commitment decisions for dangerous sex offenders
continue to be categorized as civil, sentencing courts may not be
under any obligation to inform the offender of the potential conse-
quence of a sex crime conviction. 132 Since the Kansas civil commit-
ment law did not exist at the time Hendricks was sentenced, the
court could not have informed him of the consequences. 133 So far,
state courts have not required such information, even though they
do so with regard to deportation.13 4 Therefore, sex offenders may
not be able to assess their trial strategy correctly, or adjust their
behavior during imprisonment.
The inability to assess the likelihood of the imposition of civil
commitment after the criminal justice sentence has been served
also inserts unpredictability into the prisoner's life. This, in turn,
may lead to behavioral difficulties. 135 Such a reaction borne out of
frustration may be particularly likely if the offender fears civil com-
mitment-whether correctly or not-but is not provided any treat-
ment to show rehabilitation at the commitment hearing. On the
other hand, some sex offenders may sign up for unsuitable pro-
grams to be able to demonstrate treatment efforts during a poten-
128. Janus, supra note 42, at 205-06.
129. Id. at 205.
130. Id. at 205-06.
131. Id. at 191.
132. See, e.g., Kavanagh & Welnicki, supra note 77, at 40 (noting that the Massa-
chusetts courts have not required that a person pleading guilty to a sexual offense be
given notice of possible later civil commitment as a sex offender).
133. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373-74 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Kavanagh & Welnicki, supra note 77, at 40-41. In most states, deportation is
the only potential collateral consequence of which offenders must be informed at sen-
tencing. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 708 (2002).
135. Dorsett, supra note 89, at 155.
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tial subsequent civil process, which would deprive other, more
suitable offenders of such treatment.136
For the above reasons, involuntary confinement does not present
a principled way of addressing the danger sex offenders may pose
to the community. Such confinement would serve greater overall
justice and save valuable resources only if the likelihood of being
sent into the involuntary commitment process after having served
one's criminal sentence could be predicted at the time of sentenc-
ing. A determination of involuntary commitment and imprison-
ment at the same time should also lead to a decrease in the length
of prison terms for sex offenders since those would be guided by
retributive rather than incapacitative considerations, while danger-
ous offenders could subsequently be incapacitated.
A unitary model would fulfill the goals of the traditional punish-
ment regime, provide predictability to criminal defendants, assure
visibility, and place sanctions that pursue traditional punishment
goals squarely into the criminal arena. The existing German sen-
tencing regime will allow us to test what such a system would look
like and how it would function. The model, as it operates pres-
ently, does not present an ideal system but rather provides the nec-
essary impetus for re-thinking our current approach.
II. SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING IN GERMANY
In recent years Germany has faced similar issues regarding the
sentencing of sex offenders as the United States. 137 The highly
publicized rape-murder of a number of young children led to calls
for increased sentences for sex offenders in the mid-1990s.' 38 Since
then, the German parliament has broadened the definitions of
criminal offenses in the sexual arena, expanded sentence ranges,
and created the possibility for additional, non-prison sanctions.139
Because of their sweeping nature, some have argued that the
136. Cf. J6rg Kinzig, Als Bundesrecht gescheitert-als Landesrecht zulAssig?,
2001(20) NJW (NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT) 1455, 1459 (2001) [hereinafter
Kinzig, Als Bundesrecht gescheitert] (discussing projected difficulties with imposition
of Sicherungsverwahrung at the end of prison term).
137. The two countries are not alone in their approach to sexual offenders. For a
discussion of the Canadian response, and especially its use of preventive detention for
sex offenders, see generally Henry, supra note 45.
138. See, e.g., Hornle, supra note 9, at 641-43.
139. Id. at 644-71, 674-80.
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changes that have occurred constitute a re-ordering between lib-
erty and security interests, with the latter dominating.14 0
Among the sanctions available to German courts is the so-called
Sicherungsverwahrung which allows for the confinement of offend-
ers separate from the criminal incarceration, based largely on the
141 cini mdanger of recidivism the offender poses. This sanction is im
posed at sentencing. 42
A. "Penalties and Measures for Improvement and Safety"
German criminal law has traditionally distinguished between
penalties on the one hand and the so-called "measures for im-
provement and safety" (Massregeln der Besserung und Sicherung)
on the other.143 While the full complement of criminal procedural
protections governs penalties, not all such protections apply to
Massregeln, which seem to fall between the civil and criminal para-
digms. 44 Massregeln include suspension of a driver's license as
well as Sicherungsverwahrung.145 In both cases the protection of
the public is the governing objective. 46 This contrasts with crimi-
nal penalties where the sentence must be proportionate to the of-
fense. 47 Although penalties are retributive, within that goal the
state may pursue preventive measures, such as the rehabilitation of
the offender as well as protection of the public. 148 Nevertheless,
penalties must accord with the proportionality principle and may
not exceed the retributively permissible range while Massregeln are
based on preventive concerns, such as the offender's dangerous-
ness.' 49 For those reasons, a dramatic rise in the length of impris-
onment for select offenders seems impossible under German
140. Hans-Jorg Albrecht, Die Determinanten der Sexualstrafrechtsreform, 111(4)
ZsTW (Zeitschrift ffir Strafrechtswissenschaft) 863, 865 (1999).
141. Hornle, supra note 9, at 675.
142. § 66 StGB.
143. See, e.g., WOLFGANG NAUCKE, Strafrecht: Eine Einfuhrung 90-105 (9th ed.
2000) (discussing distinction, including its historical development and justifications).
144. See, e.g., id. at 91-92, 101-102 (ex post facto prohibition not applicable to
Massregeln).
145. See, e.g., Johann Sch(itz, Die Rechtsfolgen der Straftat (Schluss), 1995(9)
JURA (Juristische Ausbildung) 460, 463-65 (1995) (listing Massregeln and distinguish-
ing between those which deprive offender of liberty and those that do not).
146. See, e.g., NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 93.
147. This does not mean that there is no proportionality requirement for Mass-
regeln. § 62 StGB; see, e.g., NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 100.
148. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 94.
149. Bernd Moller-Christmann, Die Massregeln der Besserung und Sicherung,
1990(10) JuS (Juristische Schulung) 801, 802 (1990).
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criminal law as it permits only proportionate and retribution-based
sentence increases. 5 0
The first German penal code of 1871 did not distinguish between
penalties and Massregeln.151 Initial proposals to separate the two
stem from the early twentieth century. 152 Despite the existence of
legislative proposals to create a bifurcated system throughout the
1920s, Massregeln were not introduced into the German penal code
until 1933.153 Even though the implementing legislation for the du-
alist system was passed in the early days of the Nazi regime, it was
not originally conceived by the Third Reich, but has much deeper
roots in German criminal law theory. 54 By that time, a number of
other European countries had already adopted such a bipartite
sentencing regime. 55
The need for such a dual system arose because criminal justice
theorists considered a retribution-based penalty system an insuffi-
cient response to dangerous offenders who need additional rehabil-
itative treatment before being released back into society.156 Rather
than changing the purposes of criminal sanctions to include inca-
pacitation and prevention as primary goals or leaving the issue of
the dangerous offender unresolved, the penal system opted for the
adoption of a dualist system where the penalty regime, governed
by legal responsibility for the severity of the offenses, was supple-
mented by a regime of Massregeln designed to treat the offender
and provide public safety. 57
Among the measures included in the original catalog was the so-
called Sicherungsverwahrung which, albeit with modifications, con-
150. Schlitz, supra note 145, at 464.
151. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 94.
152. Id.; see Wolfgang Frisch, Die Massregeln der Besserung und Sicherung im
strafrechtlichen Rechtsfolgensystem, 102(2) ZSTW 343, 345-47 (1990).
153. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 94.
154. Miuller-Christmann, supra note 149, at 802. This did not prevent the Nazis
from using-and abusing-the concept in their interest.
155. See, e.g., Enzo Musco, Massregeln der Besserung und Sicherung im strafrech-
tlichen Rechtsfolgensystem Italiens, 102(2) ZSTW 415, 415 (1990).
156. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 96; Frisch, supra note 152, at 345-47.
157. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 96 (outlining possible responses to the dilemma of
having a retribution-focused criminal system while having to address the needs of and
concerns about dangerous offenders).
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tinues to exist today.15 8 Increasingly, it has come to be applied to
sex offenders. 159
B. Sicherungsverwahrung
The Sicherungsverwahrung presents a way to deal with offenders
who are viewed as posing an ongoing danger to society, which does
not end with their retribution-based sentence. 6 ° Originally, it be-
came part of the German penal code in November 1933.161 De-
spite changes, it exists to this day. Like all Massregeln, it is
considered justified when the protection of the public and the pre-
vention of crime clearly outweigh the individual's interest in liberty
and development of his personality. 62 Therefore, it can be ex-
plained either because the public is justified in depriving an indi-
vidual of his liberty who abuses it in a criminal manner, or because
the public has a right to self-defense. 63
The largest number of offenders sentenced to Sicherung-
sverwahrung ever was 268, in 1968.164 In the 1980s and early 1990s,
however, the annual number of commitments has never surpassed
forty. 16 This means about two hundred individuals are confined in
this manner at any point in time. 66
1. Procedure
German courts can impose Sicherungsverwahrung only if the of-
fender has already been sentenced to two terms of imprisonment
of at least one year on an earlier occasion; 167 he spent at least two
158. The other Massregeln that deprive offenders of liberty are confinement in a
psychiatric hospital and in a drug rehab center. §§ 63-64 StGB; Schuitz, supra note
145, at 463. Three other Massregeln which do not deprive the offender of her liberty
are also available: intensive supervised release (FUhrungsaufsicht) deprivation of a
driver's license, and the prohibition on exercising one's profession. § 61 StGB; see
Muller-Christmann, supra note 149, at 803.
159. Jorg Kinzig, Die Praxis der Sicherungsverwahrung, 109(1) ZEITSCHRiFT FOR
DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 122, 132 (1997) [hereinafter Kinzig, Die
Praxis].
160. Jorg Kinzig, Die Sicherungsverwahrung: bewahrt oder obsolet?, 30(3) ZRP
(ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK) 99, 99 (1997) [hereinafter Kinzig, Die
Sicherungsverwahrung].
161. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 122 n.2.
162. Miller-Christmann, supra note 149, at 803.
163. Schutz, supra note 154, at 464.
164. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 131.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. While such a classification appears to make all low-level recidivist felony of-
fenders potentially liable for Sicherungsverwahrung, we must consider that statutorily
prescribed and imposed penalties in Germany are substantially lower than in the
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years in prison or under a measure depriving him of liberty for
those or other offenses; on the present occasion he faces at least
two years imprisonment; and he poses a danger to the public be-
cause he is likely to commit further serious offenses. 6  The danger
consists of serious offenses which harm the victim substantially, ei-
ther emotionally or physically, or inflict serious economic dam-
age.1 69 The court can impose Sicherungsverwahrung also on a
serial offender who does not have any prior convictions but who is
currently being sentenced for three intentional offenses for which
he receives at least three years imprisonment.170 In the case of cer-
tain sex offenses the offender may be subject to Sicherung-
sverwahrung if he has a prior conviction for a similar offense for
which he was sentenced to at least three years imprisonment. 17
Moreover, no prior record is required if the offender has commit-
ted two sexual offenses for which he could receive at least a two-
year sentence and is sentenced to at least three years.1 7 2 The cru-
cial prerequisite for the imposition of Sicherungsverwahrung is that
the court finds the offender likely to commit serious offenses in the
future. 173 To help it make such a determination, the court must
appoint an expert, and consider the offender's criminal and social
history. 74 It appears that the prosecutor's request for an expert
United States. Even though historically a fair number of relatively minor property
offenders has been confined through Sicherungsverwahrung, see infra notes 187-190
and accompanying text, the requisite length of imprisonment is not easily convertible.
For a general comparison of sentence length, see Thomas Weigend, Sentencing in West
Germany, 42 MD. L. REV. 37, 40-89 (1983).
168. § 66(1) StGB.
German law does not currently permit the imposition of Sicherungsverwahrung on
juveniles and young offenders since they are not legally considered fully responsible.
Schuitz, supra note 154, at 463. United States sex offender commitment legislation
also applies to juveniles. WASH. REV. LAWS § 71.09.030(2) (2003).
Doctrinally unresolved remained the problem of imposition of Sicherung-
sverwahrung following one or multiple life terms which was prohibited unless a life
term resulted from multiple time-limited sentences. Jens Peglau, Zur Anordnung der
Sicherungsverwahrung neben lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe, 2000(40) NJW 2980, 2980
(2000). Recent legislative changes, however, allow imposition of Sicherung-
sverwahrung now despite a life sentence. The practical relevance of this legislative
change will be limited since release from a life sentence-as well as release from
Sicherungsverwahrung-is based on a positive prediction of social integration.
169. § 66(1)3 StGB.
170. Id. § 66(2).
171. Id. § 66(3).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 66(1)3, (2), (3).
174. § 80a STPO; THEODOR LENCKNER ET AL., Schonke/Schroder, Strafgesetzbuch-
Kommentar 887 (26th ed. 2001) (discussing issues, such as offender's upbringing, prior
criminal record, onset of first offense, types of offenses, social behavior, character,
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testimony on the question of future dangerousness virtually
prejudges the question of whether Sicherungsverwahrung should
be imposed. 175
As a consequence of violent sex crimes against children-some
of which were committed by recidivists-Sicherungsverwahrung for
sex offenders has been expanded. 76 Until recent changes in legis-
lation, Sicherungsverwahrung ran a maximum of ten years the first
time it was imposed; at the second time it could be unlimited. 177
Now a court can impose Sicherungsverwahrung for an unlimited
period the first time. 78 For those offenders currently in Sicherung-
sverwahrung release occurs at the ten-year mark only if the court
determines that the offender is no longer likely to commit another
serious offense. 179
The only recent and comprehensive study on Sicherung-
sverwahrung, done by J6rg Kinzig of the Max Planck Institute for
Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg, Germany, in-
dicates that-prior to the legislative change-in the three German
states studied the average time an offender spent in Sicherung-
sverwahrung was slightly over four years. 80 Only sixteen offenders
had been held for more than ten years; nine of them were sexual
offenders, largely pedophiles.' 81
Historically, Sicherungsverwahrung could be imposed for all
types of offenses, including minor property crimes, as long as the
offender fulfilled the statutory sentencing prescriptions. 82 The
most serious initial criticism levied against Sicherungsverwahrung
which court should consider in determining whether offender continues to be danger-
ous); Schutz, supra note 150, at 463.
175. Michael Kilchling, Kolloquiumsdiskussion "Die Praxis der Sicherung-
sverwahrung", 109(1) ZSTW (Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft) 165,
168 (1997) (presenting Kinzig's findings).
176. JOrg Kinzig, Schrankenlose Sicherheit?-Das Bundesverfassungsgericht vor
der Entscheidung uber die Geltung des Rfickwirkungsverbots im Massregelrecht,
20(6) STV (Strafverteidiger) 330, 330 (2000) [hereinafter Kinzig, Schrankenlose
Sicherheit?].
177. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 125.
178. § 67 StGB. For a description of the legislative process, see Kinzig, Schranken-
lose Sicherheit?, supra note 176, at 330-31. The changes were conceived because of
two offenders, including one sex offender, who were about to be released at the end
of their ten-year Sicherungsverwahrung even though the psychiatric staff feared the
commission of serious violent offenses. Id. at 330.
179. § 67d(3) STGB.
180. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 157-58.
181. Id. at 158-59.
182. § 66(1), (2) STGB (providing no limitation on types of offenses that constitute
prerequisiste for Sicherungsverwahrung other than that they must be intentional
crimes); Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 132 n.46 (discussing prior empirical
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focused on its wide availability.183 In empirical studies conducted
largely during the 1970s it became clear that most of those in
Sicherungsverwahrung were small time property and fraud offend-
ers.184 These findings parallel those on the impact of the three-
strikes legislation in California, which has been justified in part as a
preventive and incapacitative measure. 185 In Lockyer v. Andrade,
the Supreme Court upheld California's legislation against an
Eighth Amendment challenge, even though Andrade had been
sentenced to a minimum of fifty years in prison based on two shop-
lifting incidents combined with two prior burglary convictions. 86
Kinzig's more recent empirical study indicates, however, that the
number of sexual offenders in Sicherungsverwahrung has increased
as compared with the number of property offenders.1 87 By the
early 1990s, they constituted about one third of all those in
Sicherungsverwahrung,1 88 and most of them had prior convictions
for sexual offenses. These data accord with the statutory focus on
the prevention of serious future offenses, especially those causing
physical or psychological harm.
Compared to some other violent offenders, sex offenders in
Sicherungsverwahrung had relatively short prison sentences. 18 9
This may be due to the fact that many of them were found to have
limited legal responsibility for their actions, due to some mental
abnormality. 190 In general, there seems to be an inverse relation-
ship between the length of imprisonment and the length of
Sicherungsverwahrung.191 Some have argued that this indicates
that judges consider imprisonment and Sicherungsverwahrung a
unit, which would violate the notion that they serve different func-
tion.' 92 One could also find, however, these data to indicate that
studies of Sicherungsverwahrung which showed higher percentage of property offend-
ers held).
183. Cf. Denno, supra note 44, at 1352-53 (describing overinclusiveness of earlier
"sexual psychopath" legislation: "The harmless groups [homosexuals, peepers, exhibi-
tionists and fetishists] thus constituted a substantial portion of institutionalized sex
offenders.").
184. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 130; Kinzig, Die Sicherungsverwahrung,
supra note 160, at 100.
185. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 85 (2001).
186. 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1170-71 (2003).
187. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 132, 134.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 142-43.
190. Id. at 145.
191. Id. at 160.
192. Id.
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courts understand the different purposes the two forms of confine-
ment serve, and that Sicherungsverwahrung implies an impaired
mental state.
As all Massregeln, Sicherungsverwahrung is imposed at sentenc-
ing, as part of the overall sentence imposed on the offender. Ini-
tially, the offender's dangerousness is assessed at the time of
trial.193 Since it is a Massregel, which is based on the public's safety
needs rather than a retributive penalty, the time must not necessa-
rily be served, assuming the offender constitutes no longer a dan-
ger.1 94 After the offender serves two thirds of his sentence, a
special chamber of the court responsible for parole decisions will
determine whether the Sicherungsverwahrung can be suspended.' 95
The judges serving on this court must be particularly trained as to
the safety and rehabilitative effect of penalties and Massregeln.196
Kinzig's recent empirical study has indicated that such suspension
occurs in almost twenty percent of all cases, 197 with sexual offend-
ers benefiting from it slightly less frequently.' 98
A similar assessment of dangerousness occurs at the time of re-
lease from imprisonment and after that every other year.199 Gen-
erally, the review of Sicherungsverwahrung during the time it is
served is very restrictive. Courts are more inclined to side with
experts who predict future offenses.20  Once Sicherung-
sverwahrung is suspended, the offender will be subject to intensive
supervision (Fuhrungsaufsicht) through a probation officer.2 '
193. Mtiller-Christmann, supra note 149, at 804. At that point the court may con-
sider the impact of a long prison term and likely personality changes because of in-
creasing age. Formelle Voraussetzungen der Sicherungsverwahrung, 2000(3) NSTZ
138, 139 (discussing the judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof published July 14, 1999-3
StR 2/0/99 (LG Wuppertal)).
194. In contrast to other measures, the Sicherungsverwahrung generally follows the
penalty phase, and neither one replaces the other, even though it can be suspended.
There is no attempt made, though to replace the penalty phase through Sicherung-
sverwahrung or vice versa. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 101. For a discussion of the
reasons for the order of measures and penalties, see Muiller-Christmann, supra note
149, at 805.
195. § 67e STGB; LENCKNER ET AL., supra note 174, at 901-03.
196. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 103.
197. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 153. The same study found that the
release rate varies widely between different German states. Id.
198. Id. at 154.
199. §§ 67c, 67e STGB; see Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 125.
200. For the situation under United States' laws, see Janus, Preventing Sexual Vio-
lence, supra note 42, at 202-03.
201. §§ 67, 68 SrGB; SchUtz, supra note 150, at 464. The goal of FUhrungsaufsicht
is to protect the public while allowing the ex-offender to reenter society successfully.
Schiitz, supra note 145, at 464.
1648
SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT
In only about one third of all cases was the release from
Sicherungsverwahrung revoked. This is slightly higher than the gen-
eral recidivism rate for those sentenced to Sicherungsverwahrung,
which is about one quarter.20 2 But in almost all cases the offenders
committed relatively minor offenses.20 3
2. The Challenges
a. More Sicherungsverwahrung
Some challengers of Sicherungsverwahrung have argued that
public safety alone, or the perception of public safety, can never
constitute a sufficient justification for confinement.20 4 The decreas-
ing number of referrals during the 1980s and early 1990s appeared
to indicate that many prosecutors and courts shared this view.
During this time, efforts to abolish Sicherungsverwahrung seemed
destined to succeed. With the perceived increase in violent sex
crimes, however, the opposite occurred. The availability and
length of Sicherungsverwahrung were increased. 0 5 No longer is
the first imposition of Sicherungsverwahrung limited to ten
years.20 6 Now courts can end Sicherungsverwahrung after ten years
only if they find the detained no longer likely to commit serious
offenses.20o
Even though the Sicherungsverwahrung is imposed at sentenc-
ing, Germany's penal law distinguishes between criminal justice
sanctions, such as fines or imprisonment, and Massregeln.208 As a
Massregel, Sicherungsverwahrung is not covered by some tradi-
tional procedural protections, including the ex post facto rule.20 9
Therefore, the German Parliament allowed for the retroactive ap-
plication of the lifting of the ten year time limit to those currently
202. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 156.
203. Id. at 157.
204. See, e.g., id. at 164.
205. Jorg Kinzig, Neues von der Sicherungsverwahrung-ein Oberblick fiber den
Stand der Gesetzgebung 1 (June 2002) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Kinzig,
Neues von der Sicherungsverwahrung]; Kinzig, Schrankenlose Sicherheit?, supra note
176, at 330-31.
206. Kinzig, Schrankenlose Sicherheit?, supra note 176, at 330-35 (discussing re-
moval of ten year maximum of Sicherungsverwahrung).
207. 67d(3) STGB. For a summary of the critique of recent legislative develop-
ments, see VAN ZYL SMIT, supra note 113, at 162-64.
208. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 90-99.
209. Id. at 91, 103-04 (discussing that expansion of Sicherungsverwahrung for sex
offenders is exempt from prohibition on ex post facto laws).
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in Sicherungsverwahrung.21 ° Some of the individual German states
have gone yet farther and allow for the retroactive application of
Sicherungsverwahrung, similar to the example provided by the
Kansas legislature in Hendricks.2 1 This means that even offenders
released from any criminal justice sanctions could be detained in
Sicherungsverwahrung if a change in circumstances makes them ap-
pear to constitute a threat to public safety.
The federal government in Berlin also passed legislation that al-
lows courts to state in their sentencing judgments that it was "im-
possible to determine with sufficient likelihood" whether the
offender constitutes a threat to public security.212 If that occurs,
the offender's dangerousness will be assessed about six months
prior to his release.213 Since the law went into effect just last fall, it
is too early to assess its impact. It appears, though, to undermine
many of the advantages-legally and with regard to treatment-of
the current German legislation. All of these developments have
caused some to charge that public safety and protection have come
to trump concerns about the unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty.214
b. Risk Assessments
Because the goal of Sicherungsverwahrung is to provide greater
protection of the public, the assessment of the offender's future
dangerousness is crucial. Such a determination, however, is notori-
ously unreliable. Therefore, many have argued that Sicherung-
sverwahrung should be abolished since it fails to fulfill its goal-
public safety-largely because the prediction of dangerousness is
fraught with error.215 The Sicherungsverwahrung does not require
210. For a stringent critique of this extension, see Kinzig, Schrankenlose
Sicherheit?, supra note 176, at 331-35.
211. See generally Jrg Kinzig, Als Bundesrecht gescheitert-als Landesrecht zulas-
sig?, 20 NJW (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift) 1455, 1455 (2001) [hereinafter Kinzig,
Als Bundesrecht gescheitert] (discussing legal developments in Baden-Wuirttemberg);
Kinzig, Neues von der Sicherungsverwahrung, supra note 205 (discussing state laws
allowing for the imposition of Sicherungsverwahrung on incarcerated or released of-
fenders if events after their conviction make it likely that they constitute a danger to
bodily integrity; such events include the rejection of treatment). The German courts
and possibly the European Court of Human Rights will have to determine whether
the implemented changes violate the German Constitution and/or the European Con-
vention of Human Rights. For a sampling of opinions on this issue, see Kinzig, Neues
von der Sicherungsverwahrung, supra note 205, at n.33.
212. Kinzig, Neues von der Sicherungsverwahrung, supra note 205, at 7.
213. Id. at 7-8.
214. Id. at 331.
215. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 125-28.
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a finding of a mental abnormality but rather only of an "inclina-
tion" (Hang) to commit further offenses. No criteria outline how a
court is to find such an inclination.z16 Law and practice, however,
provide some guideposts.
A court may impose Sicherungsverwahrung only upon expert
medical advice.217 In addition, such assessments prove very influ-
ential with the court, as Kinzig's study indicated. In about sixty
percent of all cases in which the offender was ultimately sentenced
to Sicherungsverwahrung, the experts found a psychopathic or
other mental disorder.218 This indicates that in more than half of
the cases in which Sicherungsverwahrung was imposed, the formal
requirement of U.S. law-mental abnormality or personality disor-
der-would have been fulfilled. In almost all cases did the experts
draw conclusions about the offender's future dangerousness.2 19 In
all cases in which the experts predicted future offending, the courts
imposed Sicherungsverwahrung.22 ° In the rare cases in which the
experts made no such finding, the courts usually appointed a sec-
ond expert.221 It appears therefore that most experts considered
their appointment to assess an individual's dangerousness as a call
to find such.222
In addition to the expert's advice and in the absence of other
criteria, the offender's prior record appears to hold the most pre-
dictive power.223 A long prior record frequently indicates that the
offender is older. Sicherungsverwahrung, however, may be unnec-
essary for many older offenders even if they have a long list of
prior offenses as they tend to be past the prime of their criminal
career.224 This is particularly true for property and even many vio-
216. Id. at 126-27. The same problem also applies to the hearings before the parole
chamber. See id. at 128.
217. § 246a StPO.
218. It is unclear whether that percentage is higher for sex offenders.
219. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 149.
220. Id. at 149-50.
221. Id. at 150.
222. Georg Kiipper, Diskussionsbericht uber die Arbeitssitzung der Fachgruppe
Strafrechtsvergleichung bei der Tagung der Gesellschaft ftr Rechtsvergleichung am
14.9.1989 in Worzburg, 102(2) ZSTW (ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE STRAFRECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT) 448, 449 (1990).
223. Id. at 451.
224. Sicherungsverwahrung appears to be imposed often in cases where the of-
fender's criminal career is likely over. Kinzig, supra note 161, at 128. For certain
categories of sex offenders this might be of lesser concern since their proneness to
commit future crime is not tied to their chronological age. See, e.g., GORDON C.
NAGAYAMA HALL, THEORY-BASED ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTION OF
SEXUAL AGGRESSION 87 (1996); see also Robert F. Schopp et al., Expert Testimony
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lent offenders, both groups eligible for Sicherungsverwahrung.2 5
In light of methodological problems, the lack of legal guidance, and
the breadth of offenses which make an offender eligible for
Sicherungsverwahrung, prediction of danger under the current
German system leaves much to be desired.
c. Confinement and Treatment
Problems related to confinement and treatment also arise under
the German regime. The consecutive sequence of penalty and
Sicherungsverwahrung is often incomprehensible to the individual
offender and therefore does not contribute to reintegration.226 Ad-
ditional criticism is connected to the conditions under which the
offender is being held. Because of safety concerns, offenders in
Sicherungsverwahrung do not generally enjoy benefits usually
available to those imprisoned, such as the ability to leave the
prison regularly during the final part of a sentence, as part of the
reintegration process.22 Therefore, Sicherungsverwahrung is often
conducted under conditions similar to if not more severe than reg-
ular imprisonment.2 8
Treatment is mandated, however, throughout the prison sen-
tence so as to minimize the likelihood that the offender will be sent
to Sicherungsverwahrung.229 Complaints about the type and
amount of treatment offered during imprisonment and Sicherung-
sverwahrung exist.2 30 They focus on the limited number of treat-
ment spaces and the fact that some of the offenders who were
sentenced to Sicherungsverwahrung are considered too old for
and Professional Judgment.- Psychological Expertise and Commitment as a Sexual
Predator after Hendricks, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 120, 134-37 (1999) (discussing
research findings as to recidivism of sex offenders); but see JOHN MONAHAN, RISK
AND RACE: AN ESSAY ON VIOLENCE FORECASTING AND THE CIVIL/CRIMINAL Dis-
TINCTION 26 (2003) (Canadian review of actuarial studies indicates that rate of
recidvisim for rapists declines with age).
225. § 66(1), (2) STGB (only limitation on triggering offenses are requirements that
these are intentional and offender be sentenced to a minimum sentence of two and
one year, respectively). Recidivism data indicate that recidivism declines steeply with
increased age. See, e.g., LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 18, at 7.
226. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 128.
227. Id. at 129, 155.
228. Id. at 128-29. This is referred to as Etikettenschwindel (sticker fraud).
229. Kinzig, Neues von der Sicherungsverwahrung, supra note 205, at 4 (referring
to court decision criticizing prison for not providing treatment facilities to offender
immediately upon his incarceration).
230. Letter from Dr. Jorg Kinzig, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and Interna-
tional Criminal Law, to Nora V. Demleitner (Mar. 24, 2003) (on file with author).
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treatment.231 It is likely that such complaints will increase in light
of the possible indefinite extension of Sicherungsverwahrung. So
far, treating therapists had an incentive to rehabilitate an offender
because of mandatory release upon first commitment, though indi-
vidual offenders were guaranteed release even without treatment
success.
232
d. Geographic Disparity
The Kinzig study indicates that geographic disparities have de-
veloped in the imposition of Sicherungsverwahrung.233 Kinzig
found a substantial number of offenders to be sentenced to
Sicherungsverwahrung in one jurisdiction which appeared to be
due solely to the preference of only one district attorney who regu-
larly asked for its imposition.234 This indicates the lack of sufficient
guidelines for prosecutors in the selection of cases for
Sicherungsverwahrung.
Such disparate application is always likely to occur if guiding
principles for prosecutors and courts are absent. While appellate
courts can review the judgment made by trial courts, they cannot
police the prosecutors' choice to demand Sicherungsverwahrung.
e. Summary
These problems indicate that the German Sicherung-
sverwahrung, especially in its more recent incarnation, provides no
perfect model for the United States system. With all its flaws, how-
ever, it presents a more honest, rational, and coherent way to sen-
tence dangerous sex offenders than the ad hoc method available
through civil commitment. Moreover, the adoption of the overall
approach, with appropriate modifications, holds out promise for
the integration of other collateral sanctions into the sentencing
process, with all attendant possibilities for further "truth in sen-
tencing. "235 By integrating collateral sanctions into the sentencing
231. Id.
232. The attempts on part of some German states to impose Sicherungsverwahrung
on offenders after sentencing seems connected in part to the offenders' refusal of
treatment during incarceration. See Kinzig, Neues von der Sicherungsverwahrung,
supra note 205, at 4.
233. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 150, 153-54 (demonstrating divergence
between three German states studied).
234. Id. at 150.
235. The call for "truth in sentencing" characterized the sentencing reform move-
ment during the 1970s and 1980s that aimed at more determinate sentences and the
abolition of parole. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS 107-23 (1976) (providing theoretical framework for changes in U.S.
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process and the calculation of an overall sentence, the public and
the offender would be on notice as to the total amount of punish-
ment the offender has to serve, and what incapacitative measures
have been taken.
III. A MODIFIED SICHERUNGSVERWAHRUNG: A MODEL FOR
THE IMPOSITION OF COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
This Section outlines a new approach to the sentencing of dan-
gerous and abnormal sex offenders, by combining the German and
United States' approaches. The proposed model relies heavily on
the idea that all sanctions should be imposed at sentencing to pro-
vide the offender and the public with a clear sense of the penalty
assessed. Moreover, it advocates restrictions on coercive state
power to guarantee public safety while requiring the state to pro-
vide rehabilitation and re-entry assistance for those on whom such
power is exercised. 236
A. Rationales and Promises for Security-Based Detention
Sicherungsverwahrung, as its name implies, explicitly condones
detaining an individual for public protection.237 It is based on an
explicit incapacitation rationale, which is permitted under German
law as long as the sanction is imposed as a Massregel rather than a
penalty.238 The only apparent limitation on this power is the re-
quirement that the state must provide treatment to the offenders
so as to decrease the threat they pose.
Sex offender commitment statutes in the United States, how-
ever, are justified as non-criminal sanctions.239 Therefore, none of
the protections of the criminal process attach,240 and no penologi-
sentencing). Its goal was to give offenders and the public a more honest assessment
of the length of sentence offenders would have to serve. See, e.g., Kay A. Knapp,
Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing Structures, 64 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 679, 685 (1993). For a discussion of the impact federal "truth in sentencing"
grants had on state sentencing legislation and practices, see WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL.,
URBAN INST., THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN
STATE'S SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS (2002).
236. For a description of the re-entry movement, see JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., UR-
BAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRIS-
ONER REENTRY (2001); see also WILLIAM J. SABOL & JAMES P. LYNCH, URBAN INST.,
PRISONER REENTRY IN PERSPECTIVE (2000).
237. See, e.g., SchUtz, supra note 145, at 463-64.
238. See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 152, at 345-48.
239. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
240. See id. (holding that because proceedings under Kansas' Sexual Predator Act
are not punitive, neither Double Jeopardy, nor Ex Post Facto Clauses apply to sex
offender confinement).
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cal justifications appear applicable. The analogy presented as the
most apt is civil commitment statutes for the insane who are held
to shield the public and them from harm,2 1 as sex offender com-
mitment statutes require the offender not only to pose a future
danger, but also to suffer from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder.242 The comparison is flawed, doctrinally as well as
practically.
1. The Role of the Mental Health System
In contrast to those with serious mental illness whom the medi-
cal establishment can at least stabilize, if not cure, it is unclear
whether sex-offender treatment will be successful for the most dan-
gerous offenders, even though some treatment appears quite prom-
ising.243  Therefore, some have argued that sex offender
commitment statutes are a "deliberate misuse of the therapeutic
state for social control. ' '244 As long as treatment for sex offenders
is not more effective, the promise of sex offender commitment stat-
utes is misleading, and ultimately disingenuous as they condone life
imprisonment for any sex offender judged dangerous.245
This assessment might be too negative as it underestimates the
success of some treatment options, which are, however, very costly.
When the state uses its coercive power to restrict the liberty of
some offenders who are adjudged to constitute a public risk be-
cause of a mental defect, it should be obligated to assist such of-
fenders to re-enter society successfully. This is especially the case
as long as our predictive ability with regard to sex offenders is very
241. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010(2), (3), (7) (2003) (providing the legis-
lative findings for civil commitment for mental illnesses).
242. E.g., id. § 71.09.010 (providing the legislative findings for Washington's Sexu-
ally Violent Predator statute).
243. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66 (accepting the Kansas Supreme Court's find-
ing that effective treatment for sexually violent predators is "all but nonexistent").
244. La Fond, supra note 104, at 655.
245. In contrast to many civil commitment statutes, sex offender commitment stat-
utes often do not require that the offender be treatable. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.040 (making no mention that an individual must be treatable to be lawfully
committed); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366-67 (establishing that the Kansas Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act is based in the state's obligation to provide care and treatment for
these individuals, but noting that many mental illnesses are not treatable); Robert M.
Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Stat-
ute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597, 609 (1992) (noting that since many civil com-
mitment statutes do not require an individual be treatable to be committed, the
emphasis of the statute is inherently shifted toward incarceration over treatment).
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low. 2 4 6 Therefore, all offenders sentenced to additional security-
based confinement should be provided with the option of treat-
ment, however expensive, during imprisonment and security-based
confinement to allow for their quick reintegration.247 Imposing se-
curity-based detention at trial also eliminates the danger that incar-
cerated sex offenders shy away from treatment out of fear that it
may ultimately be held against them.248 Treatment during impris-
onment is crucial as attempts must be made to restrict security-
based confinement to a minimum because of its coercive nature.
2. Mental Disorder or Mental Abnormality
One of the most important safeguards of the United States' ap-
proach to civil commitment is the dual requirement of assessing
mental illness and dangerousness. 249 As the Supreme Court has
indicated in a long line of cases, confinement based on dangerous-
ness alone is generally inconceivable in our judicial system.2 50 Ex-
ceptions, however, exist as the courts have permitted confinement
of individuals in the non-criminal arena on dangerousness grounds
alone. 1 Moreover, in many states the mental illness requirement
inherent in civil commitment statutes has been downgraded to a
246. See Corrado, supra note 5, at 793; Wettstein, supra note 245, at 608 (indicating
that even though accuracy of prediction may only be fifty percent, public and legisla-
tors perceive a much higher accuracy of prediction rates).
247. There are also treatment-based reasons for such a requirement: "Delays
before treatment begins permit opportunities for significant distortions and defenses
by the offender." Wettstein, supra note 245, at 617.
248. Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Pleas Process, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 579, 594 (1992). Because of high failure rates in sex offender treatment, a
rational sex offender incarcerated under the current regime may decide against treat-
ment to avoid a potential trigger for post-release confinement, as failing treatment is
more likely to lead to commitment than refusal to enter treatment. Eric S. Janus,
Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-Based Pre-
vention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1122-24
(2003) [hereinafter Janus, Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Program].
249. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 75 (1992).
250. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358; Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75; Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979). The reverse also holds true. Detention of non-dangerous
individuals who are mentally ill is not permissible. See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940) (upholding a sex offender commitment stat-
ute where applied to dangerous persons, but noting the importance of maintaining the
liberty interests of the insane through due process of law).
251. For a listing of grounds for such confinement and judicial decisions on the
subject, see, for example, Paul H. Robinson, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: The
Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 693, 711-14 (1993).
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"mental disorder" or "abnormality. '252 Those terms include per-
sonality disorders and paraphilias 3 Even a blanket assessment of
"psychopathy," for example, may be sufficient for sex offender
commitment. Determinations of such disorders are difficult to op-
pose since they are almost impossible to observe in an institutional
setting.254
Due to the seriousness of this collateral sanction, stringent re-
quirements should surround it.255  This means that either the
mental illness requirement should be applied to sex offender com-
mitment statutes,256 or at least a more stringent standard should be
applied to the broader "abnormality" definition.257 At present, a
finding of dangerousness might be sufficient to meet the abnormal-
ity standard. 8 If that is the case, then the present application of
sex offender commitment statutes does not vary from the standard
applied to Sicherungsverwahrung, which relies merely on a finding
of dangerousness, determined by prior criminal record and a psy-
chiatric assessment. 9
Tighter requirements of mental abnormality or illness would be
necessary if the analogy to civil commitment statutes held, so as to
restrict unbridled state power. If sex offender commitment is con-
ceptualized as an incapacitative criminal justice sanction, doctri-
nally the requirement could be removed. Because of the
252. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59.29 a01 (1994) (applying to individuals with a
"mental abnormality or personality disorder"); WASH REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2003)
(applying to individuals with a "mental abnormality or personality disorder"); Janus,
Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 197-98 (stating that in many sex offender
commitment cases the mental abnormality or personality disorder can be satisfied
with a showing of a personality disorder or paraphilia).
253. David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 525, 569 (1992); Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at
197-98.
254. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 198.
255. GREIo, supra note 15, at 173 (citing Verdun-Jones to the effect that "there is
always the danger that [ ] restrictive measures will be imposed upon mentally disor-
dered offenders without the benefit of the due process of law that, in theory at least, is
emphasized in the sentencing of 'normal' offenders.").
256. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010(3), (7) (2003) (providing the legislative
findings for civil commitment for mental illnesses).
257. E.g., id. § 71.09.020.
258. One of the main drafters of Washington's Sexual Predator statute even stated
that he "included this definition [of mental illness as 'personality disorder'] because it
focused on dangerousness, which was the purpose of commitment." Boerner, supra
note 253, at 569.
259. § 66 Si-GB (describing prerequisites for Sicherungsverwahrung); § 246a STPO
(requiring expert assessment prior to judicial decision on Sicherungsverwahrung); see
Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 137-49.
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uncertainty of dangerousness predictions, 260 however, a second
safeguard against the deprivation of liberty should be provided in
the form of a tight mental abnormality requirement.
Such a substantive requirement alone is insufficient. The calling
of experts at sentencing should not imply that the court wants them
to find a mental abnormality and dangerousness.26' In Hendricks,
for example, the defendant found an expert witness who was will-
ing to provide at least tentative testimony that Hendricks does not
fulfill the elements required for civil commitment.262 Some state
statutes, however, make independent expert testimony largely im-
possible because of restrictions on the selection of experts.263 Such
limitations should be abolished as courts have the legal mecha-
nisms available to them to distinguish valid from invalid scientific
methods. 264  Otherwise safety-based commitments will be deter-
mined by the prosecutor's willingness to request such confinement
based on dangerousness.265
More difficult than remedying explicit statutory limitations on
expert testimony will be confining extra-legal pressures on experts
to find dangerousness.266 Among such pressures are "a fear of lia-
bility or censure from a false prediction of safety; the absence of
any external consequences from a false prediction of violence... ;
and the tendency of clinicians to see those factors which confirm
the existing diagnosis and predictions, and ignore those which dis-
260. Combining clinical risk assessments with actuarial risk scores might prove
promising in the development of more accurate predictions of future violent recidi-
vism. See Grant T. Harris et al., Prospective Replication of the Violence Risk Ap-
praisal Guide in Predicting Violent Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 377, 389-92 (2002); see also MONAHAN, supra note 224, at 16-23, 47-48 (re-
viewing clinical and actuarial approaches to risk and advocating use of the latter in
commitment proceedings for sex offenders); Janus & Prentky, supra note 32 (manu-
script at 10, 87) (strongly advocating use of actuarial risk assessment in sex offender
commitment proceedings).
261. Demleitner, Searching for a Solution, supra note 14, at 62 (discussing how the
review process provides the judge with information to impose an appropriate treat-
ment based sentence).
262. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 n.2 (1997).
263. See, e.g., Kavanagh & Welnicki, supra note 77, at 44-45 (critiquing the require-
ments for experts under the Massachusetts civil commitment statute for dangerous
sexual offenders).
264. Daubert v. Merrill-Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
265. The Supreme Court has rejected this model. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358; see
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992) (noting that due process requires a state to
prove both mental illness and dangerousness to commit an individual to a mental
institution through a civil commitment).
266. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 202-03.
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confirm it."' 267 Due to such outside influences, which counsel in
favor of detention, the ability of a number of experts to examine
the offender is crucial. 268
B. Limited Scope of Security Detention
Safety-based detention as a sentencing option should only be
available upon conviction of a serious violent sexual offense.269
Since past behavior tends to be a reasonable predictor of future
behavior, those who committed a serious violent sex crime in the
past-combined with a set of additional factors-are more likely to
engage in such behavior in the future.27 0 Therefore, conviction of
such a crime in the past plus the additional considerations should
be the best predictor of future dangerousness.271
The recidivism rates for rapists, however, are generally low, es-
pecially if compared to those for property offenders.272 Recidivism
studies also indicate that those convicted of rape are substantially
more likely to commit a property offense than another violent sex-
ual crime.273 Therefore, even a statutory limitation is insufficient
unless combined with a stringent individual selection process.
The future threat should extend to another serious, violent sex-
ual offense that threatens a potential victim with substantial psy-
chological or physical harm.274 Since public safety concerns are
focused on random acts of violence, only sex offenders likely to
engage in such behavior-rather than, for example, violence fo-
cused on family members-should be covered.275  Nothing less
than the prediction of such a serious, "predatory" crime should be
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. For a different perspective, see Falk, supra note 90, at 147 (noting that "inde-
terminate and lifetime criminal sentences provide the flexibility of indefinite civil
commitment without sacrificing the fundamental right of Americans to be free from
physical restraint."); see also Connor, supra note 82, at 537.
270. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 18, at 9-10 tbls.10 & 11.
271. See Boerner, supra note 253, at 568 (explaining the rationale of the Washing-
ton Task Force on Community Protection when it made its recommendations regard-
ing Washington's sexual psychopath law); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(7)
(2003).
272. LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 18, at 8-9 Tbls. 9-10.
273. Id. Nevertheless, a rapist's odds of committing another rape are 3.2 times
greater than those of a non-rapist. Id. at 10.
274. See Boerner, supra note 253, at 569.
275. Id. Other measures should be taken to protect family members, a tightly cir-
cumscribed group of individuals; cf Janus, Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment
Program, supra note 248, at 1101-09, 1133 (arguing that re-allocation of resources
from sex offender commitment to other forms of prevention and treatment would
likely result in decreased recidivism).
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required to justify such a serious sanction, imposed for the greater
good of society.27 6
C. An Integrated Process: Imposing Security
Detention at Sentencing
Imposing the entire sentence-retributive-based imprisonment
and security-based confinement-at sentencing carries a number of
advantages. First, the offender is informed at this point about his
total sentence exposure. 77 Since one of the most profound criti-
cisms of indeterminate sentencing regimes was that defendants
lacked information and certainty about their release date, 278 ena-
bling the state to start civil commitment procedures for sex offend-
ers at the end of the criminal justice sentence infuses such
uncertainty and unpredictability back into the sentencing
process.
279
Second, dangerousness predictions at the point of sentencing,
which occurs usually relatively shortly after commission of the of-
fense, tend to be more accurate than those made long after the
offense, as is currently the case.28 ° Therefore, practical safety rea-
sons counsel in favor of an early assessment of risk and mental
abnormality.
Third, a joint imposition of retributive sanctions and incapacita-
tive detention allows the court to impose a sentence that considers
both factors.28' If the court determines that there is a need for
safety-based confinement, this implies a finding of mental abnor-
276. WASH. REV. CODE. § 71.09.020(9), (16) (defining "predatory" and "sexually
violent predator").
277. Cf Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997) (finding that one convicted
of a sex crime does not suffer a violation of his constitutional rights if he is subject to
civil commitment following the conclusion of his criminal sentence).
278. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
279. See Connor, supra note 82, at 539.
To allow the state to first choose the criminal sanction, which requires a find-
ing of a specific state of mind, and then when that sanction is completed, to
choose another sanction which requires a finding of the opposite state of
mind, is a mockery of justice which places both the criminal and civil systems
for dealing with sexual predators in disrepute.
Id.
280. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 200-01. It must be ac-
knowledged that if security-based detention is imposed, such predictions will become
more difficult during review hearings as the interval between the offense and such
hearings will increase over time. Id. at 200.
281. Id. at 182.
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mality.282 While such abnormality will not necessarily reach the
level of mental illness, it is nevertheless likely to decrease the of-
fender's full responsibility or control over his actions. Therefore,
the retributive sanction imposed on the offender should not be as
stringent as that imposed on an offender who does not suffer from
such a defect, and is not eligible for an incapacitative sanction.
The current system, however, does not account for such abnor-
mality in the retributive component of a sentence. s3 Either the
defense fails to produce expert testimony on such an abnormality
for monetary considerations, or it makes a strategic choice not to
do so because of concerns that this might lead to a longer, not a
shorter, sentence for the defendant, as the judge would have no
other mechanism to address her concerns about a recurrence of
serious sexual violence.284 Therefore, under the present system, it
is neither in the defense's nor in the prosecution's interest to pro-
vide such information. 2 5 A combination of retributive and pre-
ventive sanctions, however, would provide a more honest approach
to sentencing as it allows for a disintegration of the different pen-
alty components.
Fourth, even though misidentifications and false positives are
still likely at sentencing, especially since it will presumably be the
prosecutor's initial decision to demand security-based detention,
sentencing is more open and accessible than the current process.
Independent researchers and sentencing commissions would be
able to track the cases in which security-based detention was im-
posed, and should be able to point to selection bias, geographic
disparities, or other potentially distorting factors.286
Fifth, imposition of a security-based sanction at sentencing guar-
antees the defendant the procedural due process rights that gener-
ally attach at that phase. While the Kansas law at issue in
Hendricks provided Hendricks with a wide array of procedural
282. See id. at 174-75; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992) (hold-
ing that a prediction of future dangerousness without a finding of mental disability is
not sufficient to maintain an individual in civil commitment).
283. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 163.
284. See Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 579, 593-94 (1992) (illustrating how potential for later commitment
affects defense strategy and encourages "charge bargaining").
285. See id.
286. Cf. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 202 (asserting that
since only six percent of sex offenders released from prison in Minnesota are commit-
ted civilly, based on social science principles "the identification of such low base rate
phenomena will be highly error prone").
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protections usually typical of the criminal rather than the civil pro-
cess,287 such are not necessarily required for sex offender commit-
ment. Tying the commitment to the disposition of the criminal case
assures protections, such as the right to counsel, an evidentiary
hearing, an opportunity to respond to the state's evidence, a rea-
soned written or oral decision by the sentencing judge, and appel-
late review. 288 The only right currently guaranteed that would
possibly not continue-the right to a jury-might be of dubious
value in this context.289 Jury discretion might be more harmful to
the defendant, as juries frequently make up their minds before the
sentencing phase, fail to follow sentencing directions, and lack
comparative experience.29 °
Despite these advantages, imposing security-based detention at
sentencing also has drawbacks. Defendants, threatened with its
possible imposition, may attempt to engage in charge or sentence
bargaining to prevent such additional sanction.2 91 These attempts
at plea bargaining, however, may not be different, from a legal per-
spective, then what occurs in other cases.2 92 It is also likely that the
trial rate for sex offenders will rise if safety-based detention be-
comes a possibility.293 Since only a small number of sex offenders
would likely be eligible for an additional confinement, the burden
on courts should remain limited.2 94 From a psychological perspec-
287. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1997).
288. Determinate sentencing and appellate review are both inherent features of
sentencing guidelines. DALE PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCING 219-20
(1988). Hence, in non-sentencing guideline states without these measures, legislation
or judicial rules may have to assure reasoned decisions and appellate review.
289. Should jury sentencing in this area be viewed as beneficial, possibly in the
form of an advisory opinion, a sentencing jury, akin to a capital jury, could be em-
paneled. FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (2002) (advisory jury in sentencing phase of capital
case); cf. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 2002) (binding jury verdict
in sentencing phase of capital case).
290. See William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Ju-
rors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (1998).
291. This, however, is already an issue under the current regime. See Klotz et al.,
supra note 284, at 593-94 (illustrating how the Washington Sexually Violent Predators
law will cause defendants to "charge bargain" to avoid possible commitment later).
292. See id. at 583-84 nn.19-21.
293. See id. at 593-94 (noting that the Washington law may result in an increase of
defendants who decide to take their case to trial).
294. Compare this with the increase in trial rates in California under the state's
Three Strikes legislation, which tells a cautionary tale about the dangers of
prosecutorial discretion. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 185, at 126-28. Since the Cali-
fornia statute is drawn more broadly than the statute envisioned here, the likelihood
of a comparable development is limited.
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tive, a trial, however, may have a negative impact on the defen-
dant's ability to admit his factual guilt.295
D. The Length of Security Detention
While it may be advisable to limit the length of safety-based de-
tention because of the danger of abuses of state power and the
likelihood that too many offenders will be warehoused for life, a
time limit may be problematic for truly dangerous offenders whose
treatment is very difficult, if possible at all. If an indeterminate
commitment is impermissible, courts may resort to longer
sentences than retributively and incapacitatively permitted and
necessary.296 Moreover, a time limitation may necessitate the pre-
mature end of treatment that appears to lead to successful
rehabilitation.297
On the other hand, experience with Sicherungsverwahrung in
Germany has indicated that more than ten years of Sicherung-
sverwahrung are unnecessary, and in fact counterproductive.
There is some evidence that a limit of five to six years leads offend-
ers to accept safety-based preventive detention more easily.298
Some recidivist studies of sex offenders also indicate that pro-
longed detention, especially in conjunction with forced treatment,
increases the risk of recidivism.299
A time-limited security-based detention will provide mental
health professionals with a more precise prediction horizon.3 °°
While release from civil commitment is usually based on a short-
term prediction of future dangerousness, in sex offender release
determinations, experts are expected to predict recidivism over a
very long period of time.3 1 If security-based detention were lim-
ited to a ten year maximum, then that would be the maximum req-
uisite time horizon to be considered at the initial release hearing.30 2
The more short term the predictions, the more accurate they tend
to be.3 °3
295. See Klotz et al., supra note 284, at 595.
296. See, e.g., Irene Sagel-Grande, Die Massregeln der Besserung und Sicherung im
strafrechtlichen Rechtsfolgensystem der Niederlande, 103(3) ZSTW (Zeitschrift fur
Strafrechtswissenschaft) 250, 268 (1991).
297. Id. at 269. This consequence does not have to follow automatically as the of-
fender may be able to receive the same form of treatment while in the community.
298. Kinzig, Schrankenlose Sicherheit?, supra note 176, at 335.
299. See Henry, supra note 45, at 246.
300. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 200-01.
301. Id. at 201.
302. Id. at 200-01.
303. Id. at 201.
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Even though practical considerations-treatment and predic-
tion-counsel in favor of an upper limit on security-based deten-
tion well short of a life term,3 °4 the most difficult hurdle might be
judges. If the judiciary fails to embrace such a limit, it is likely that
judges will construct sentences that are longer than necessary from
a retributive perspective to circumvent the upper limit on safety-
based detention. The reason that the previously existing limits in
Germany did not have such a result, has not been active appellate
review, but rather an apparent belief on the part of German judges
that any offender has the right to be released at some point.30 5
E. Treatment
In order to demonstrate society's disapproval of the offense, the
retributive part of the criminal justice sanction should precede a
security-based sanction. Treatment for the perceived mental ab-
normality and the offender's dangerousness, however, must be of-
fered not only during the safety-based detention, but also during
the retributive part of the sentence.30 6 To provide offenders with
an effective opportunity of suspension of safety detention, they
must be allowed access to meaningful treatment while impris-
oned. 307 Rehabilitative offerings do not interfere with the retribu-
tive component of the sentence since it is fulfilled through the
deprivation of liberty and attendant privileges. 30 8
Since sex-offender treatment, because of its cognitive basis, fails
with those who refuse it rather than with those who are in coerced
confinement, its availability is not tied to a non-prison setting.30 9
304. Id.; Sagel-Grande, supra note 296, at 749-51, 753-55 (in the Netherlands, the
upper limit of four years applies only to offenders who did not commit violent crime;
for all others, courts frequently reject recommendations of prosecutors and psycho-
logical experts to prolong security-based detention, largely on proportionality
grounds).
305. Kinzig, Die Praxis, supra note 159, at 160.
306. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 206-07.
307. Fitch, supra note 32 (manuscript at 19); Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence,
supra note 42, at 206-07.
308. Compare the array of rehabilitative services, ranging from literacy programs to
drug treatment, offered in prisons. Such programs, however, have been substantially
and negatively impacted by the budget crises in the states. See, e.g., V. Dion Haynes
& Vincent J. Schodolski, Strapped States Turn to Prisons, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 2003, at
8; Haya El Nassen, Red Ink Overtakes State Budgets, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2001, at
3A.
309. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 206. For a more troubling
assessment of the exchangeability of treatment for "sexual psychopaths" in prison and
in a mental institution, see Garland, supra note 46, at 75 (quoting Superintendent for
the Alabama State Mental Hospital).
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In fact, mental health and prison settings operate with the same set
of incentives and disincentives: "They both use the threat of
lengthy incarceration, and the incentive of possible release from
incarceration, to obtain consent and cooperation with
treatment.
310
Successful treatment addressing the mental abnormality or the
dangerousness of the offender during imprisonment or at any point
during safety-based detention should lead to the offender's release
either after the imprisonment phase or as soon as possible thereaf-
ter.311 The overall goal should be to limit preventive detention as
much as possible, so as to restrict the state's coercive powers.312
Due to the ongoing possibility of successful treatment and rehabili-
tation,313 during safety-based detention sentence reviews should
occur annually.314 For these reasons, annual reviews have also
been proposed, albeit not implemented, in Germany.315
Once a determination of release has been made, sex offenders
should be allowed to graduate back into the community by living in
a supervised residential setting and then through receiving treat-
3161hment-based supervision. Under the current regime, however, re-
lease has been virtually non-existent. 317  Only eighty-two
individuals committed as "sexually violent predators" have been
released from confinement nationally.318
IV. THE BROADER GOAL:
PURPOSIVE SANCTIONING AND LIMITING PUNISHMENT
In the United States sexual offenders have been exposed to ever
longer sentences, often based on the perceived high danger of re-
cidivism connected to their offenses. 319 Because of its constitution-
310. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 207.
311. See id. at 182-83.
312. See id. at 183-85.
313. See id. at 183-84, 206-07.
314. GREIG, supra note 15, at 262 (evincing concern about "the gulf between the
psychiatrist's social and therapeutic obligations and [] ethical issues about a division
of loyalties.").
315. The current law allows for reviews at any point. § 67e(1) STGB. It mandates
reviews every other year, but the court can shorten this timeframe. Id. § 67e.
316. Wettstein, supra note 245, at 622; see Fitch, supra note 32 (manuscript at 6-7)
(some states allow for sex offender commitment on an outpatient basis; the numbers
are small, however).
317. Fitch, supra note 32 (manuscript at 7).
318. Id.
319. A number of studies seem to indicate that the recidivism rate for sex offenders
overall is not higher, and may even be lower, than for all convicted criminals. E.g.,
LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 18, at 8-9 tbls. 9-10. Certain sub-groups of sex offend-
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ally mandated focus on proportionality, German penal law does
not permit for the unbounded lengthening of sentences as a viable
alternative. For that reason, it has fallen back on safety-based al-
ternatives, in the form of Massregeln.320
Safety-based detention of a small number of highly dangerous
and mentally defective sex offenders imposed at sentencing might
help reduce the public's perception of a heightened general danger
emanating from all sex offenders.321 The availability of such an ad-
ditional sanction should liberate judges from incapacitative con-
cerns in their imposition of imprisonment so that they can focus on
its retributive effect. 322 The separation of retributive- and risk-
based sentencing would constitute a first step toward integrating
collateral sanctions into the overall sentencing framework while
beginning the process of assigning sentencing purposes to specific
sanctions. While German criminal law is concerned about the col-
lapse of penalty and Massregel, in terms of their purposes and func-
tions,323 for United States' criminal law, a separation of sanctions in
terms of their purposes and functions would be the first step to-
ward disentangling the two, and toward moving away from the
flawed civil-criminal dichotomy currently employed.324
One of the potential, salutary consequences of this development
may be a decrease in the length of prison terms imposed on sex
offenders who are mentally defective or cannot control their ac-
ers, however, may have a higher re-offending risk, and those seem to commit the most
serious sexual offenses. Id.
320. Kilchling, supra note 175, at 170-73 (discussing Jescheck's comments asserting
that lengthened penalties violate the sense of justice more than the Sicherung-
sverwahrung and Schoch's concern about the potential increase in length of imprison-
ment if Sicherungsverwahrung were abolished).
321. For a discussion of the same doctrinal approach, see Robinson, supra note 251,
at 716.
322. For a discussion of the focus on individual culpability in sentencing, see Janus,
Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 211 ("The principle of criminal intersti-
tiality would allow civil commitment nonetheless, but only if the individual's mental
disorder rendered him or her unamenable to criminal prosecution."). In defending
the concept of individual responsibility in criminal adjudications, Eric Janus rejects
prevention-based sex offender commitment statutes, while Paul Robinson defends
them, see Robinson, supra note 251, at 716-17.
323. Kinzig, Schrankenlose Sicherheit, supra note 176, at 334.
324. See supra note 9.
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tions.325 In such cases, it is incapacitation that frequently leads
courts to impose long sentences under the present system.326
Unfortunately, the opposite may occur as well, and the German
experience counsels some caution. Historically, the more rehabili-
tative the penalty phase in Germany, the more Massregeln came to
focus on social assistance.327 Recent events in Germany have
shown, however, that the harsher criminal penalties become, the
harsher are attendant Massregeln.328 Some have even argued that
the recent expansion of Sicherungsverwahrung undermines rather
than supports the retributive character of penal law since legal and
factual responsibility are only an initial step toward the imposition
of punishment. 329 In light of its already highly punitive character, it
is conceivable that the United States would follow this model, and
the possibility of preventive detention for sex offenders would lead
to even longer, more punitive sanctions for all .33° This, however,
might be a risk worth taking since sex offenses in the United States
already have substantially longer maximum and presumptive sen-
tencing ranges. 331 Even if no immediate decrease in retributive
sanctions were measurable, a focused purposes discussion and
oversight through sentencing commissions might be valuable gains.
The lessons learned from moving determinations on safety-based
detention into the sentencing process would be useful in creating a
similar framework for other collateral sanctions. Currently, such
sanctions are not considered at sentencing. How they should be
considered is not easily ascertainable as it might be difficult to de-
termine how much of an imprisonment discount a drug offender
should get for the life-long denial of access to public housing, or
how much of an imprisonment discount is due a nurse who helped
defraud Medicare because of an effective ban from nursing upon
325. Robinson, supra note 251, at 700; see Boerner, supra note 253, at 564-65 (argu-
ing for desert as limiting principle even in sentencing of sex offenders, and against
indeterminate sentences requiring showing of absence of danger for release of sex
offenders); Stephen R. McAllister, Some Reflections on the Constitutionality of Sex
Offender Commitment Laws, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1011, 1018-19 (2002) (arguing
against Hendricks' position which seems to lead inevitably to longer incarceration).
326. McAllister, supra note 325, at 1019.
327. NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 104.
328. Id. (noting the connections between penalties and Massregeln).
329. See Kinzig, Neues von der Sicherungsverwahrung, supra note 205, at 9.
330. Robinson, supra note 251, at 705-06. At least one commentator has argued
that restrictions on sexual offender commitment laws that make their use more oner-
ous and inefficient have increased "pressure to criminally convict [sex] offenders." Id.
at 705.
331. LaFond, supra note 104, at 667; see Weigend, supra note 167, at 45-49 (compar-
ing German and American sentencing).
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her release. Such difficult questions would have to be considered
by an expert body that could ascertain the purposes underlying
such collateral sanctions, ascertain whether they are risk-based,
and how they should be weighed. It would then be up to the courts
to craft individualized sentences in which risk-based collateral
sanctions were merged with more traditional punishment.
If security-based detention, which presents the starkest collateral
sanction,332 were to move into the sentencing process, sufficient at-
tention would be generated to bring questions of purposes and
functions of such sanctions to the fore.333 Ultimately, the goal has
to be to forge a basket of sanctions that assures retributive sanc-
tions proportionate to the harm committed and also public safety.
Collateral sanctions may assist in the latter and provide a valuable
alternative to longer and more costly incarceration.334 This, how-
ever, will only be the case if these sanctions are risk-based and indi-
vidualized rather than imposed on broad categories of offenders
where they would constitute merely a further burden on
reintegration.
CONCLUSION
Criminal penalties and safety-based detention can be conceived
as exchangeable elements of social control that supplement each
other.335 If that is the case, a unitary approach to the sentencing of
dangerous and mentally abnormal sex offenders necessitates a
more serious, and long overdue discussion about the state's coer-
332. Only deportation is likely to be considered of rising to almost the same level of
restriction as security-based confinement. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the
Impact of the 1996 Deportation Law and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1938-43 (2000) (discussing the 1996 deportation laws and how
they have affected legal permanent residents). While the latter deprives an individual
of her liberty, the former may deprive her of her way of life, and throw her into an
unknown environment, as is the case for some permanent residents who came to the
United States as small children and were later deported, usually upon commission of
a criminal offense. See, e.g., id. at 1939-41, 1962 (discussing Jose Velasquez's story);
see also Velasquez v. Reno, 37 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664-65 (D.N.J. 1999).
333. Currently, a few so-called collateral sanctions are directly deniable at sentenc-
ing, but most of them center on the denial of public benefits to drug offenders. See
Demleitner, "Collateral Damage", supra note 94, at 1034-35; Robert W. Musser, Jr.,
Denial of Federal Benefits to Drug Traffickers and Drug Possessors: A Broad Reaching
But Seldom Used Sanction, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 252, 255 (2000) (discussing how
only few courts impose such sanctions if not mandated by law). Because of the lim-
ited use of such sanctions, no academic or public discussion has taken place about the
function or purpose of such additional measures.
334. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 42, at 168-69.
335. See NAUCKE, supra note 143, at 104.
1668
2003] SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT 1669
cive power and its responsibility for those it incarcerates and de-
tains. This, however, will not occur as long as so-called safety
measures with a clearly punitive component occur in secret, apart
from the punishment process.
IIS.
